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AN IRONIC AND UNNECESSARY CONTROVERSY:
ETHICAL RESTRICTIONS ON BILLING GUIDELINES




Insurance defense lawyers, insurance companies, and hold-
ers of insurance policies are all likely to suffer much detriment
and gain little benefit from recently imposed ethical restrictions
on the use of billing audits and billing guidelines. During the
past three years, a series of controversial opinions by the ethics
committees of bar associations in twenty-four states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have warned that insurance defense attorneys
may violate their ethical duty to maintain client confidences by
permitting independent legal auditors to review their bills at the
request of insurance companies.1
* Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law of Samford University;
A.B., Stanford, 1976, J.D., 1979, Harvard.
1. For a complete list, as of February 2000, see Ala. State Bar, Office of
the Gen. Couns., Op. RO-98-02 (1998); Alaska State Bar Ass'n., Ethics Op. 99-1
(1999); Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 (1999); D.C. Bar Legal
Ethics Comm., Op. 290 (1999); Fla. Bar Staff, Op. 20591 (1997); Haw. State
Bar, Formal Op. 36 (1999); Ind. State Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 4
(1998) (on file with author); Ky. Bar Ass'n Comm: On Ethics, Ethics Op. E-404
(1998); La. Bar Ass'n Ethics Advisory Serv. Comm., Op. 164 (1998) (on file with
author); Md. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket 99-7 (1999) (on
file with author); Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, letter from Andrew
L. Kaufman to Robert B. LaHait (1997) (on file with author); Miss. State Bar
Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 246 (1999); Mo. State Bar Ass'n, Informal Op. 980124
(1998); Neb. State Bar Ass'n Advisory Comm., Advisory Op. Jan. 8 (1998) (on
file with author); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Ethics Op. 716
(1999); N.C. State Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 10 (1998); Cincinnati
(Ohio) Bar Ass'n Ethics & Profl Responsibility Comm., Ethics Inquiry 98-99-02
(1998) (on file with author); Or. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 1999-157 (1999);
Pa. Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 97-119
(1997); S.C. Bar Ass'n Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 97-22 (1997); Tenn. Bd. of
Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-F-143 (1999); Utah State Bar Ethics Advi-
sory Op. Comm., Op. 98-03 (1998); Vt. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Responsibil-
ity, Op. 98-7 (1998); Va. State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1723
(1998) (on file with author); Wash. State Bar Ass'n., Formal Op. 195 (1999);
Wisc. State Bar Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Formal Op. E-99-1 (1999) [hereinafter,
for example, Alaska]. For a recent overview of the controversy, see Debra
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Moreover, bar officials in eleven states have contended that
adherence to insurance companies' billing guidelines may
unethically interfere with the professional judgment of attor-
neys.' Although no court has yet ruled on these issues, the
Supreme Court of Montana is scheduled to issue a declaratory
judgment concerning the ethical propriety of submission of
insurers' legal bills to auditors and insurance defense counsels'
adherence to billing guidelines.3 A California court has dis-
missed for failure to state a claim an action against a legal audit-
ing firm and several major insurance companies that alleged that
the defendants committed unfair trade practices by imposing
limitations on insurance defense fees.4
Restrictions on the use of audits and guidelines are ironic
because they are likely to harm insureds, who are the very parties
that they are intended to help. Discouragement of audits and
guidelines should tend to impede efforts by insurance companies
to control defense costs, which may increase premiums for policy
holders. Although these restrictions might in some instances
help to preserve confidential information about insureds and dis-
courage interference with the professional judgment of attor-
neys, most of the ethics opinions pronounce restrictions which
go far beyond what is needed to accomplish these goals.
These restrictions are also ironic because they may tend to
discourage ethical billing practices. Although most insurance
defense attorneys already presumably bill their time in an ethical
manner, the discouragement of the use of guidelines and audits
is likely to encourage the perpetuation of unethical practices
Baker, You Charged How Much!: Insurers Hire Independent Auditors to Pick Apart
Lawyers' Bills, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 20.
2. See Ala., supra note 1; Colo., supra note 1; Fla. Bar Staff, Op. 20762
(1998); Ind. State Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. No. 3 (1998); Iowa Sup.
Ct. Bd. of Profl1 Ethics & Conduct, Op. 99-01 (1999); Mo., supra note 1; State
Bar of Mont. Ethics Comm., Op. 900517 (1999); Tenn., supra note 1; Vt., supra
note 1; Va., supra note 1; Wash., supra note 1; Wisc., supra note 1. This list was
complete as of February 2000. A number of the state ethics opinions that do
not address the question of whether billing guidelines interfere with the profes-
sional judgment of attorneys have considered the ethical propriety of billing
guidelines that require the submission of legal bills to outside auditors. See e.g.,
Mass., supra note 1. Those opinions are really concerned with the auditing
issue rather than with guidelines per se. Accordingly, this Article will address
those opinions only in the discussion of the propriety of legal audits in Part III.
3. See In re Rules of Prof I Conduct & Insurer-Imposed Billing Rules and
Procedures, No. 98-612 (Mont. filed Nov. 4, 1998). Oral arguments were heard
on September 28, 1999, and a ruling may have been rendered by the time that
this article is published.
4. Smith v. Law Audit Servs., No. 164543 (Cal. Super. Ct., County of San
Francisco, filed Feb. 18, 1999).
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among some attorneys. The perpetuation of abusive billing prac-
tices by even a small number of attorneys tends to diminish the
public perception of all attorneys.
In addition to its irony, the controversy created by the ethics
opinions is also unnecessary because there are readily available
means for accommodating legitimate concerns about client con-
fidences and professional independence that would not unduly
restrict audits or billing guidelines. These safeguards, which are
discussed below in Part III(D), should enable insurance defense
attorneys to continue to submit their bills to legal auditors with-
out risking violation of professional rules or ethics. Although all
of the state ethics opinions recognize that the use of outside
auditors and billing guidelines would be ethical if an attorney
obtained the informed consent of the insured, many of the state
opinions propose such high standards for consent as to make
consent all but impossible.
I. THE NEED FOR LEGAL AUDITS AND BILLING GUIDELINES
The need for all types of companies to monitor the fees of
outside counsel is particularly compelling because excessive bill-
ing is all too common among attorneys.5 A taboo subject until
only a decade ago, unethical billing is now a subject about which
lawyers are speaking frankly and constructively. Two-thirds of
the attorneys who responded to a survey in 1994-95 were person-
ally aware of at least some instances of billing fraud, although
relatively few believed that this was a frequent practice.6 More
than half of the lawyers said they believed that at least five per-
cent of the time billed by lawyers in this country is padded.7
Both inside and outside counsel in that survey indicated that
large amounts of time for activities such as attorney conferences,
research, drafting of documents, and travel were excessive.'
Meanwhile, many attorneys continue to engage in such question-
able practices as billing more than one client for work performed
at the same time and billing for the time spent producing work
product for an earlier client.9
Increasing recognition of the problem of unethical billing
led to the ABA's promulgation of an opinion on billing ethics in
5. See, e.g., WILLAM G. Ross, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-
BASED BILLING By ATrORNEYS (1996); Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA.
L. REV. 659, 705-19 (1990).
6. See Ross, supra note 5, at 266, 270.
7. See id. at 266, 269.
8. See id. at 266, 270.
9. See id. at 79-88, 267, 271.
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1993,1° and a recent spate of criminal and disciplinary proceed-
ings against lawyers for fraudulent billing.11 Although judicial
scrutiny of legal bills traditionally has occurred in decisions con-
cerning statutory fee awards, courts have the right to examine
the reasonableness of bills even in cases involving private pay-
ment of bills. As the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York declared in a decision early this year, "it
is within the traditional authority of the courts to supervise the
charging of fees for legal services to reflect the quantity and qual-
ity of services rendered."12 As the court explained, "[a] ny award
of attorney's fees, whether awarded pursuant to statute or con-
tract, must be reasonable."13
Growing awareness of the problem of unethical billing,
along with increasing recognition among corporations of the
need to remain competitive through cost-cutting, has led to the
development during the past fifteen years of a flourishing legal
audit industry." Many insurance companies now routinely sub-
mit their legal bills to legal auditors. As Douglas R. Richmond
has explained:
Insurers . . . see legal auditing as a reasonable means of
controlling their defense costs. Although they do not
desire an adversarial relationship with their defense coun-
sel, they must carefully mind their financial obligations to
shareholders and policyholders. As clients, they have con-
cluded-as is their right-that cost control is a critical ele-
ment of responsible lawyering.15
The usefulness of outside auditors may have increased dur-
ing the past two years as the result of state supreme court deci-
10. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
93-379 (1993) (discussing billing for professional fees, disbursements, and
other expenses).
11. See Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense
Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 205 (1999). In Illinois, at least ten
attorneys have been suspended from practice or disbarred for billing fraud dur-
ing the past seven years. SeeJamesJ. Grogan, Paper presented at the ABA 24th
National Conference on Professional Responsibility 12-14 (May 28, 1988)
(unpublished paper, on file with author); see also Michael D. Goldhaber, Overbil-
ling is a Big-Firm Problem Too, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 11, 1999, at 1.
12. Cutner & Assoc. v. Kanbar, No. 97 Civ.1902(SAS), 1998 WL 104612, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1998).
13. Id.
14. See Ross, supra note 5, at 221-27. See also Claire Hamner Matturro,
Auditing Attorneys'Bills: Legal and Ethical Pitfalls of a Growing Trend, 73 FLA. BARJ.
14, 14-19 (1999); Larry Smith, A Profession in Transition: Auditors Expand Practice
Amid Growing Criticism, OF COUNS., Oct. 4, 1993, at 5-14.
15. Douglas R. Richmond, Of Legal Audits and Legal Ethics, 65 DEF. CouNs.
J. 512, 525 (1998).
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sions in Illinois and Texas which denied legal remedies to
attorneys who were fired from law firms in retaliation for report-
ing violations of the Rules of Professional Responsibility.16 In the
Texas case, the court held that a law firm could dismiss a partner
for making a good faith accusation of overbilling against another
partner, without subjecting the law firm to damages in tort for
breach of fiduciary duty. 7 The Illinois court held that an attor-
ney could be dismissed for insisting that a law firm cease its prac-
tice of filing consumer debt collection actions in the wrong
venue.
18
Two dissenting justices in the Texas case aptly warned that
the decision "sends an inappropriate signal to lawyers and to the
public that the rules of professional responsibility are
subordinate to a law firm's other interests."19 Similarly, the dis-
senter in the Illinois case pointed out that the court's decision
"serves as yet another reminder to attorneys . . . that, in certain
instances, it is economically more advantageous to keep quiet
than to follow the dictates of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility."2"
Although one would hope these decisions would not dis-
courage the presumably honest majority of attorneys from con-
tinuing to follow ethical billing practices, these decisions, as the
dissents suggest, are likely to exacerbate unethical conduct by
attorneys already inclined toward dishonest billing. In addition
to encouraging unethical billing in two of the nation's most pop-
ulous states, they also may encourage misconduct in other states
in anticipation of similar rulings elsewhere. Accordingly, these
decisions make the need for legal auditors greater than ever
before.
The need for legal audits may be especially high in the insur-
ance industry, which is a major consumer of legal services and
may have been the victim of a disproportionate amount of exces-
16. SeeJacobson v. Knepper & Moga, 706 N.E.2d 491, (Il. 1998); Bohatch
v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998); cf. Wieder v. Skala, 561 N.E.2d
105, 110 (N.Y. 1992) (an at-will attorney fired for reporting another attorney's
misconduct stated a claim for breach of contract based on an implied duty to
comply with the rules of the profession). For a sound critique of Bohatch, see
Margaret Kline Kirkpatrick, Partners Dumping Partners: Business Before Ethics in
Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 83 MINN. L. Rv. 1767 (1999). For a discussion of
Jacobson, see Debra Cassens, Attorney Can't Sue for Retaliatory Firing, A.B.A.J., Apr.
1999, at 31.
17. See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 54547.
18. SeeJacobson, 706 N.E.2d at 493.
19. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 561 (Spector, J., & Phillips, J., dissenting).
20. Jacobson, 706 N.E.2d at 494 (Freeman, CJ., dissenting).
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sive billing.2' Economic pressures in the insurance industry have
encouraged insurance companies to try to curtail excessive legal
costs, both fraudulent and non-fraudulent.2 2 The incentive to
reduce legal bills is particularly acute because litigation costs are
estimated to range from nearly thirty percent to nearly fifty per-
cent of every claim dollar. 3 Moreover, some insurance defense
lawyers may be tempted to pad their bills because insurance com-
panies typically pay low rates for attorney services.2 4
One commentator has also suggested that overbilling in
insurance defense cases is a legacy of the high interest rates of
the 1980s, when insurance companies were willing to pay their
attorneys for protracted litigation because the high returns that
they earned on their investment income as they delayed payment
of claims more than compensated for additional defense costs.
25
The willingness of insurance companies to pay more lavish legal
bills attracted the services of large law firms, which used elabo-
rate and sometimes wasteful case preparation procedures that
insurance companies traditionally had shunned.2 6 When interest
rates plummeted during the 1990s, insurance companies began
21. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 5, at 24-25; Lisa G. Lerman, Scenes From a Law
Firm, 50 RUTGERS L. Rjv. 2153 (1998) (reporting confession of overbilling by
attorney who worked for an insurance defense firm); James P. Schratz, I Told
You to Fire Nicholas Farber-Psychological and Sociological Analysis of Why Attorneys
Overbill, 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 2211, 2213, 2215 (1998). As an amicus brief in the
Montana case has explained, the insurance industry has stood "at the forefront
of the movement to more efficiently manage litigation .... Through its com-
bined resources it remains one of the world's largest consumers of legal serv-
ices." Brief for Amicus Curiae Legalgard, Inc. at 2, In re Prof'1 Conduct &
Insurer-Imposed Billing Rules & Procedures, No. 98-612 (Mont. filed Nov. 4,
1998).
22. In explaining the growth of legal auditing in the insurance industry,
one commentator has observed:
The increasing economic pressure on liability carriers to keep costs
down in a soft insurance market has led to profound changes in the
insurance industry, including consolidation and mergers to achieve
economies of scale as well as significant price competition to maintain
premium bases. Even while premium dollars have become more
scarce, insurers have suffered from rising loss adjustment expenses.
Brian S. Martin, Audits of Law Firm Bills: The Issues Inside and Out, INs. LrTIG.
RP., July 1, 1999, at 355 (footnote omitted).
23. See id. The use of legal audits in the industry was inspired in part by
"[m]ounting litigation costs," which "led to higher policyholder premiums" and
produced "[plublic clamor for cost-effective efficient disposition of litigation."
Brief of Amicus Curiae Legalgard, Inc. at 2, In re Profl Conduct (No. 98-612).
24. See Darlene Ricker, Greed, Ignorance and Overbilling, A.B.A. J., Aug.
1994, at 66 (quoting James P. Schratz).
25. See Andrew G. Cooley, Audits of Attorney Bills, FOR DEF., Feb. 1998, at
26. See id.
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seeking means of reducing costs and found they could cut legal
fees more easily than they could reduce indemnity or raise
premiums.
27
Cost-cutting campaigns by insurance companies have
strained their relations with defense counsel. Some insurance
defense counsel allege that carriers' concern with paring costs
has encouraged diminution of the quality of legal services.2
Insurance companies, however, have suggested that the ethics
opinions are a thinly disguised means of circumventing reason-
able efforts to curb costs through the use of guidelines and
outside auditors.29 Similarly, Jed Ringel, the president of Law
27. See id.
28. See Andrew G. Cooley, Fee Audits: Coming Full Circle and Looking Down
the Road, FOR DEF., June 1999, at 53:
Veterans of the insurance defense business lament for the days when
the outside defense lawyer and the insurance carrier had a strong pro-
fessional relationship. That relationship was based on trust, not sharp
bargaining. The shared trust tended to ensure that insureds got an
adequate defense, the lawyer got paid a fair amount, and the insurer
was satisfied, without any quibbling, that the lawyer had provided good
service for a reasonable expenditure.
Those days are gone, and the defense lawyer now has a much
more arm's length relationship with the carrier. Trust has been
replaced with mercenary negotiations. In some companies' minds,
outside counsel are the mere gallons of gas in the legal engine, com-
pletely fungible, with the only criterion being the hourly rate.
29. See Bruce R. Meckler & Mari Henry Leigh, The Ethical Use of Outside
Auditors and Billing Guidelines (Nov. 12, 1998) (unpublished paper presented
at Annual Claims Exposition & Conference in St. Louis, Missouri, on file with
author) ("While many of these lawyers are genuinely concerned about the qual-
ity of legal services that insureds receive, others clearly are motivated by self-
interest"); John S. Pierce et al., Ethics or Economics?: The Ethics of Insurer-
Imposed Billing Guidelines and the Propriety of Permitting Billing Statements
to be Received by Third-Party Auditors 2 (Feb. 22, 1999) (unpublished paper
presented at Mealey's Conference on Attorney's Fees in Phoenix, Arizona, on file
with author):
Concerned about their economic state, . . . [insurance defense]
associations have collectively formulated efforts to stage a coordinated
assault on the insurance industry's litigation management pro-
grams.... Each of these ... assaults is premised on the supposition
that the implementation of these programs poses an "ethical" (not
economic) dilemma.
See alsoJoint Brief of Respondents at 18, In re Prof I Conduct & Insurer-Imposed
Billing Rules & Procedures, No. 98-612 (Mont. filed Nov. 4, 1998):
The gist of Petitioners' complaints and the complaints of their amici-
almost all of whom are themselves defense lawyers unhappy with scru-
tiny of their legal fees-is the allegation that certain claims manage-
ment and cost-containment practices adopted by the Respondent
insurance companies could cause defense counsel to violate their ethi-
cal duties to insureds.
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Audit Services, a leading legal auditing firm, has suggested that
insurance defense attorneys are using the ethical opinions to
mask their opposition to insurers' efforts to control legal fees.
According to Ringel, "[t]his is not an ethical issue. It's a market-
place issue."3°
The growing practice of auditing insurance defense attorney
bills has vexed many insurance defense attorneys."' Audits some-
times cause delay of payment from insurance companies, which
traditionally have ameliorated the impact of their relatively low
compensation by paying legal bills more promptly than other cli-
ents. 32 Moreover, the growth of legal auditing has forced insur-
ance defense counsel to spend more time preparing, checking,
and defending legal bills. 33  Although audits may have
encouraged some insurance defense attorneys to turn to other
areas of practice, the numbers are so small that this does not
appear to be a significant problem for the insurance industry.34
Although insurance companies could avert the dangers of
disclosure of confidential information as identified in the ethics
opinions by employing in-house auditors to review legal bills,
many insurers do not find this option to be satisfactory. In-house
auditors may be more costly since they are full-time staff mem-
bers or are claims adjusters who could more profitably be
employed on other work. Moreover, inside auditors may lack the
independence of outside auditors. In yet another irony, inside
auditors may therefore have more incentive than outside audi-
tors to recommend the economies that the ethics opinions con-
tend will prejudice insureds.
There are no generally accepted accounting principles for
legal auditing, and the methodology of legal auditors varies
widely, as do their backgrounds and the types of services they
provide.35 Many legal auditors are lawyers and are quite familiar
30. Baker, supra note 1, at 23 (quoting Ringel).
31. See Lisa Brennan, Outside Audits Draw Bar Dissent, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3,
1998, at A6; Anna Snider, Firm Quits Client Over Outside Auditor, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 9,
1999; Angela Wissman, Insurance Defense Lawyers Feel the Squeeze, MERRILL'S ILL.
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1998, at 1.
32. See Wissman, supra note 31.
33. See id.
34. See Snider, supra note 31 ("the exodus has not been overwhelming");
Wissman, supra note 31 ("Top partners at insurance defense firms say they still
want the files, because they enjoy the relationship they have with their clients,
insurance companies offer a steady stream of work and carriers pay their
bills.").
35. See Cooley, supra note 25, at 22; James P. Schratz, Cross-Examining a
Legal Auditor, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 91, 93-99 (1996).
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with the exigencies of managing litigation.3 6 Although many
legal audits are conducted retrospectively, an increasing number
of clients are requesting so-called "front-end" audits, which are a
management tool by which clients assess the cost-effectiveness of
ongoing deployment of attorney resources.3 7
A properly conducted audit can benefit insureds as well as
insurers by ensuring proper case management. As one insurance
defense attorney has acknowledged:
The policyholder is better defended where there is diligent
servicing of defense counsel bills. Often, the auditor's
review of bills necessitates more particular consideration by
the insurer of the work being performed by defense coun-
sel, and prospectively, requires insurer input to the defense
strategy. Even from the purely logistical perspective,
outside auditors facilitate an insurer's provision of its duty
to defend, much like CPA firms assist large corporations
.... By these activities, the outside auditor aids the insurer
in the management of the defense, particularly under
recently prevalent insurance contracts that include insur-
ance defense costs within limits.
38
II. THE TRIPARTITE RELATIONSHIP IN INSURANCE DEFENSE CASES
The question of the ethical propriety of the use of legal
auditors and billing guidelines has arisen primarily in the con-
text of insurance defense work because of the anomalous ethical
position of insurance defense attorneys, who serve two masters-
an insured and an insurance company, whose interests are not
always the same. The practical and legal underpinnings of this
so-called tripartite relationship among insureds, insurers, and
insurance defense attorneys have been succinctly described by
one commentary:
In a sense, the insurer pre-sells attorney's [sic] services
to those who purchase its liability policy. The insurer cre-
ates the attorney-client relationships when it selects the
attorney of its choice. The practice that the insurer con-
trols the defense because of the provisions of its policy has
been recognized as not only customary but also as legally
proper. Such a contractual provision has been construed
36. See Ricker, supra note 24, at 65. Some of the state bar opinions are
premised on the assumption that auditors to whom their opinions refer are not
attorneys. See, e.g., Wisc., supra note 2.
37. See Ross, supra note 5, at 224.
38. David R. Anderson, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Outside Auditors:
Oil and Water?, FOR DEF., June 1999, at 22, 27.
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as consent by the insured for the insurer to select counsel
for the defense. Some courts have said that the purchase
of a liability policy containing such a provision is a prior
consent by the insured to dual representation.
3 9
Although insureds may reject the attorney selected by the
carrier, such action may breach the insurance contract. 40 Simi-
larly, most insurance contracts require the insured to cooperate
with the insurer in the management of the insured's defense.
The Fifth Circuit has stated that control by the carrier is virtually
absolute where-as in most cases-the insurance coverage for
the claim is adequate for payment of the entire claim.4"
In permitting insurance companies a high level of control
over claims litigation, courts have even upheld contractual provi-
sions that have allowed insurers to settle claims over the objec-
tions of insureds.4 2 As one commentator has pointed out, "[t] his
relationship is unique. In no other area of the law are parties
routinely represented by counsel selected and paid by a third
party whose interests may differ from those of the individual or
entity the attorney is defending."
4
Courts generally presuppose, however, the absence of a con-
flict of interest. As the Supreme Court of Missouri has explained:
[Both the insured and its carrier] are interested in dispos-
ing of the case on the best possible terms. Only the
insurer's money is involved. Even though the insured may
be interested in minimizing liability and damages, perhaps
because of apprehension about insurance coverage and
rates, this concern introduces no conflict and there is no
reason why the same lawyer may not represent both
interests. 4
4
At least until recently, "there has been somewhat of a con-
sensus that a lawyer who represents an insured in an insurance
defense case has two clients."45 Courts generally have agreed
that the insurance defense attorney represents the insurance
company as well as the insured even when the claim against the
39. RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 488-89
(4th ed. 1996) (citations omitted).
40. See id.
41. See Davenport v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 927, 931
(5th Cir. 1992).
42. See id. at 932.
43. Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle of Insurance Defense
Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 476-77 (1996).
44. In re Allstate Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo. 1987).
45. Timothy W. Bouch & D. Jay Davis,. His Master's Voice: Just How Many
Are There Anyway?, PROF. LAW., May 1997, at 18, 20.
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insured exceeds the amount of the insurance policy or goes
beyond the scope of the policy.46
As Professor Charles Silver has pointed out, however, "the
law of professional responsibility has never been entirely corn-.
fortable with the notion that defense counsel has two clients.
Recognition of the company's status as a client is usually accom-
panied by the admonition that counsel must show special regard
for the interests of the insured."47 Accordingly, the prevailing
law requires that "[d]efense counsel owes the same unqualified
loyalty as if personally retained by the insured. The loyalty to the
insured should be paramount since that client's defense is the
sole reason for the attorney's representation."48 As the New York
Court of Appeals has declared, "the paramount interest
independent counsel represents is that of the insured, not the
insurer. The insurer is precluded from interference with coun-
sel's independent professional judgment on behalf of its cli-
ent."49 Similarly, many of the state ethics opinions regarding
submission of insurance defense bills to legal auditors have
emphasized that the insurance defense attorney's principal duty
is to the insured. 50
Accordingly, the dual client theory has come under increas-
ing scrutiny during recent years. Critics of the dual client theory
have pointed out that defense attorneys are likely to subordinate
their duties to the insured in order to satisfy the carriers who pay
their fee and who are in a position to provide more work in the
future.5" Several states have modified it, at least in cases in which
46. See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 39, at 487-89 (citations omitted).
47. Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or
the Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1583, 1587 (1994).
48. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 39, at 489-90 (case citations omitted).
49. Feliberty v. Damon, 527 N.E.2d 261, 267 (N.Y. 1988).
50. See, e.g., N.C., supra note 1 (the insured, rather than the insurance
carrier, is the lawyer's primary client); Or., supra note 1, 1999 WL 521543, at *1
("Both the disciplinary rules and insurance law . . . require that an attorney
hired by the insurer to defend the insured must treat the insured as 'the pri-
mary client' whose protection must be the attorney's 'dominant' concern.").
51. See, e.g., Robert E. O'Malley, Ethical Principles for the Insurer, the Insured
and Defense Counsel: The Eternal Triangle Reformed, 66 TUL. L. REv. 511, 512
(1991). As one court observed:
Even the most optimistic view of human nature requires us to realize
that an attorney employed by an insurance company will slant his
efforts, perhaps unconsciously, in the interests of his real client-the
one who is paying his fee and from whom he hopes to receive future
business-the insurance company.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. of N.Y. v. McConnaughy, 685 F.2d 932, 938
n.5 (8th Cir. 1978).
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conflicts of interest have arisen between insurers and insureds.52
The traditional dual representation theory, however, continues
to prevail elsewhere. Many of the recent ethics opinions con-
cerning the submission of insurance bills to auditors have like-
wise reiterated this dual representation doctrine, while others
have regarded only the insured as the client. 3 Following state
law, the Washington state opinion declared that "in Washington
it is clear that legally and ethically the client of the lawyer is the
insured."54 Only in the rare instances in which a direct conflict
of interest arises between the insurer and the insured do some
states require an insurance company appoint independent coun-
sel for the insured.55
The state ethics opinions concerning outside audits have
relied heavily upon state judicial decisions and ethics opinions
which have affirmed that an insured is a client of the insurance
defense attorney. Some of these opinions state that the insured
is the attorney's only client. For example, the Florida opinion
relied upon other Florida ethics opinions in declaring that "an
insurance defense lawyer's client is the insured, not the insur-
ance company.
56
A recent ABA ethics opinion acknowledged that "[t]he
Model Rules of Professional Conduct offer virtually no guidance
52. See Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 448 N.W.2d 804 (Mich. Ct. App.
1989), modified, 475 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. 1991). In Bell, the court held that an
insurance company could not maintain a malpractice action against an insur-
ance defense attorney because no attorney-client relationship existed between
the company and the lawyer, even though the company hired the lawyer, paid
his fee, and was the principal victim of his alleged malpractice. See id. One
treatise has described Bell as "an anomaly." MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 39, at
492. See also Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 1145 (Haw. 1998); Safeway Man-
aging Gen. Agency, Inc. v. Clark & Gamble, 985 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Ct. App.
1998); Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133 (Wash. 1986).
53. See, e.g., Colo., supra note 1; Wisc., supra note 1.
54. Wash., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.wsba.org/
bog/pres/fo/fo195.html> (citing Tank, 715 P.2d 1133; Van Dyke v. White, 349
P.2d 430, 437 (Wash. 1960)); see also Cincinnati (Ohio), supra note 1 ("The
insured, not the insurance company, is the client.").
55. This attorney is popularly known as "Cumis counsel," after the deci-
sion in San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
56. Fla., supra note 1, available at 17 TRIAL ADvoc. Q. 7, 8 (1998) (citing
Fla. St. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. 97-1 (1997) (concluding that an
attorney representing an insured could not follow the insurance carrier's
instructions about filing a summary judgment motion when such instructions
would be contrary to the insured's best interests); Fla. St. Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Prof 1 Ethics, Op. 81-5 (1981) (holding that an attorney could not withhold
information regarding the settlement value of a case from the insured even if
the insurer directed this)).
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as to whether a lawyer retained and paid by an insurer to defend
its insured represents the insured, the insurer, or both.""v
According to this opinion, "[t]he Model Rules assume a client-
lawyer relationship established in accordance with state law, and
prescribe the ethical obligations of the lawyer that flow from that
relationship."" The opinion concluded, however, that when the
insured is the client, either alone or jointly with the carrier, the
Rules-rather than the insurance contract-govern the carrier's
attorney's obligations toward the insured."
The ethical duties that insurance defense counsel owe to an
insured in a tripartite relationship, however, are specified with
clarity in Rule 1.7(b), which provides:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibility to another client or third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When rep-
resentation of multiple clients in a single matter is under-
taken, the consultation shall include explanation of the
implications of the common representation and advan-
tages and risks involved.6"
Furthermore, Rule 1.8(f) provides:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a
client from one other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's indepen-
dence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer
relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation of a client
is protected as required by Rule 1.6.61
Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers, which was approved by the American Law Institute in
1998, provides:
(1) A lawyer may not represent a client under circum-
stances in which someone other than the client will wholly
57. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
96-403 (1996).
58. Id.
59. See id. at 3.
60. MODEL RuiEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1998).
61. Id. Rule 1.8(f). Rule 1.6, as is explained in greater detail below in
Part III(B), protects client confidences.
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or partially compensate the lawyer for the representation,
unless the client consents ....
(2) A lawyer's professional conduct on behalf of a cli-
ent may be directed by someone other than the client
when:
(a) the direction is reasonable in scope and charac-
ter, such as by reflecting obligations borne by the person
directing the lawyer; and
(b) the client consents to the direction... .62
As Professor Karon 0. Bowdre has explained:
The attorney cannot forget that the relationship with the
insured is that of attorney and client, just as if the insured
hired and paid the attorney directly. The attorney, there-
fore, must adhere to the same ethical and fiduciary obliga-
tions due any client, which includes the duty to keep the
insured informed about the proceedings.63
III. LEGAL AUDITS Do NOT NEED TO INTERFERE WITH
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT OR COMPROMISE
PROTECTED COMMUNICATIONS
A. Professional Judgment
Some critics of the use of outside auditors have suggested
that the use of such auditors may improperly interfere with the
lawyer's exercise of professional judgment in violation of Rule
5.4(c) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which pro-
vides that "[a] lawyer shall not permit a person who recom-
mends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for
another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment
in rendering such legal services. '"" As Professor John Freeman
has warned:
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs § 215 (Pro-
posed Final Draft, No. 2, 1998). Although the ALl approved Proposed Final
Draft No. 2 at its 1998 annual meeting, it appointed an ad hoc committee to
ensure that the final version adequately reflects the membership's vote to add a
"black-letter requirement that any direction of a lawsuit by a third person not
interfere with the lawyer's independent judgment on behalf of the client" and
that such direction be "reasonable in scope and character." Ronald E. Mallen,
Looking To the Millenium: Will the Tripartite Relationship Survive?, DEF. COUNS. J.,
Oct. 1999, at 482-83. The final version had not been promulgated as ofJanuary
2000.
63. Karon 0. Bowdre, Conflicts of Interest Between Insurer and Insured: Ethi-
cal Traps for the Unsuspecting Defense Counsel, 17 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 101, 111
(1993).
64. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 5.4(c) (1998).
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Unlicensed outsiders, untrained in the law and not subject
to ... disciplinary oversight, have no business trying to reg-
ulate how lawyers exercise their independent professional
judgment on behalf of client-insureds. Decisions about
how to handle a case are to be made by attorneys and cli-
ents and not by independent contractors hired to criticize
lawyers and slash legal bills.65
According to Freeman, "[a] lawyer who allows his or her litiga-
tion strategy or tactics to be regulated by a nonclient outside
auditor risks discipline for assisting in the unauthorized practice
of law."
66
Although the issue of interference with professional judg-
ment has tended to arise in the state ethics opinions in connec-
tion with the use of billing guidelines rather than in connection
with the use of legal auditors, some of the opinions suggest that
legal auditors interfere with the professional judgment. For
example, the Cincinnati Bar Association's opinion expresses
"concern that allowing non-lawyers to make crucial decisions
about motion practice, selection and retention of experts, and
what constitutes necessary legal research" violates the ethical rule
requiring attorneys to exercise their professional judgment.6 7
Similarly, the Wisconsin opinion stated:
Depending upon the particular contract between the
outside audit firm and the insurer, the audit company may
be authorized to direct how the defense should be con-
ducted to reduce costs, and these directions to defense
counsel may relate to decisions about the nature of the
professional services that are to be provided to insureds.
The auditors also may have authority to disallow charges
for legal services that the auditor deems to be
inappropriate.
68
Few if any legal auditors, however, dictate to lawyers how
they should manage a case. Much of the advice that auditors
provide is not remotely related to issues of professional judg-
ment. For example, an attorney could not complain that a client
was interfering with her professional judgment by following an
auditor's advice to the client to refuse to pay for mark-ups on
65. John Freeman, Resolving Fee Disputes, S.C. LAW., Feb. 2000, at 12.
66. Id. Professor Freeman likewise warns that "[t] he auditor who tries to
dictate litigation strategy risks punishment for engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law. The insurer who empowers the auditor risks liability for aiding
and abetting the unauthorized practice of law." Id.
67. Cincinnati (Ohio), supra note I (citation omitted).
68. Wisc., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.wisbar.org/
ethop/formal/ethics99-1.html>.
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telephone calls, recycled work, or work that is performed at the
same time that the client is performing billable work for another
client-all of which are practices condemned by the ABA opin-
ion on billing ethics.6" Similarly, an attorney's professional judg-
ment is not compromised by complaints that billing entries are
too vague or that she lumped multiple activities into single
entries; many courts have disapproved of these practices.7y
To the extent, however, that auditors may influence the
instructions that clients provide to attorneys about how to con-
duct litigation, the attorney is free to respond as he would
respond to any other instructions from the client. If he disagrees
with the instructions, he may remonstrate with the client and
must withdraw from the case if he believes that he cannot act
with independent judgment. While law firms tend to defer to
the auditors' judgment,7 1 there are numerous means by which
attorneys can challenge a legal auditor's conclusions.7 2 Contrary
to the assumptions of the proponents of prohibitions on submis-
sion of insurance defense bills to legal auditors, there is no rea-
son to suppose that legal auditors routinely try to slash bills in
order to justify their fees. An auditor presumably would lose
credibility if it encouraged a client to engage in penny-wise and
pound-foolish practices which diminished the quality of the cli-
ent's legal representation. Accordingly, auditors are generally
careful, within reasonable limits, to defer to the billing judg-
ments of attorneys. One legal auditor has explained: "The stan-
dard is reasonableness, not perfection. With 20/20 hindsight, it
69. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 93-379 (1993).
70. See, e.g., Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, No. 87C5112, 88C9800,
1999 WL 184173, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 1999) (striking four time entries for
vagueness); Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Ungar, 42 F. Supp. 2d 296, 305 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (stating that courts have frowned on blocked time entries); Kirsch v. Fleet
Street, Ltd., No. 92 Civ. 932 (DLD), 1996 WL 695687, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4,
1996) (disapproving of vague time entries).
71. As legal consultantJohn W. Toothman has explained, most firms "will
very quickly cut 25 percent of the bill, especially if they think it will repair the
relationship and keep your business." Maura Dolan, When the Lawyer's Bill is Out
of Bounds, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1994, at 1.
72. See Schratz, supra note 35, at 94-101. Mr. Schratz, himself a legal audi-
tor, has advised lawyers to ask whether the auditors conducted an on-site review
of the files; whether the auditors have sophisticated computer programs for
reviewing the bills; and whether the auditors reviewed 100 percent of the billing
entries, or merely sampled them. See id. Mr. Schratz has also advised lawyers to
inquire about the auditors' experience and to obtain a copy of the audit report.
See id. Although Mr. Schratz's has made his recommendations in the context of
fee litigation, there is no reason why any audited attorney could not make the
same inquiries.
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is easy to identify departures from some theoretical ideal of how
a project should have been managed.... Charges are unreasona-
ble only when departures from the norm are persistent, pervasive
or substantial."73
B. Disclosure of Confidential Information
The state ethics decisions are based upon the state counter-
parts of Rule 1.6(a) of the American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides in pertinent part:
"A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation
of a client unless the client consents after representation. 74
The obligation imposed by Rule 1.6 is broader than the
attorney-client privilege. 71 In contrast to the attorney-client privi-
lege, which "protects only information revealed by the client to
the lawyer in confidence," Rule 1.6(a) "protects all information
relating to the representation of a client. '76 Similarly, Mr. Rich-
mond has explained in his discussion of the recent state ethics
opinions that "[t]he attorney-client privilege generally applies
only if the communications at issue were intended to obtain legal
advice or assistance, while a lawyer's duty of confidentiality under
Rule 1.6 reflects the duty of loyalty to clients in addition to the
principles underlying the attorney-client privilege. 77
Rule 1.6(a) appears- to bind insurance defense attorneys
even when insurance companies-which are not bound by the
73. Bennett Feigenbaum, How to Examine Legal Bills, J. Accr., May 1994, at
84, 86.
74. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1998).
75. As the Utah opinion points out with reference to Utah's rule, "Rule
1.6(a) is broader than the attorney-client privilege." Utah, supra note 1, 1998
WL 199533, at *2.
76. Id. See also id. (quoting the comment to Rule 1.6(a):
The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of
law, the attorney-client privilege in the law of evidence ... and the rule
of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-cli-
ent privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a law-
yer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce
evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality
applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from
the lawyer through the compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule
applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the cli-
ent but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever
the source.
77. Richmond, supra note 15, at 515 (citing In re Anonymous, 654 N.E.2d
1128 (Ind. 1995) (reprimanding attorney for revealing client information that
was available from public sources); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 461
S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 1995) (reprimanding state's attorney general for disclosing
client information that was available under Freedom of Information Act)).
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rules of attorney ethics-submit their bills directly to the audi-
tors. Procedures for submitting legal bills to outside auditors dif-
fer among companies. Some insurance companies require their
attorneys to submit their bills directly to the outside auditor,
78
while at least a few companies may be forwarding their legal bills
to the auditor without notifying their attorneys. 79 Although the
latter procedure superficially appears to constitute a means to
cut the ethical Gordian knot-since attorney ethics rules are not
binding on insurance companies-such a procedure could cause
problems for both insurance companies and their outside audi-
tors. The circumvention of the attorneys could expose the com-
panies to bad faith claims, and willful ignorance by an attorney
that his or her bills are being sent to an auditor might not relieve
the attorney of his ethical obligations to the client."0
The Maryland ethics opinion warned that the attorney
should request the carrier to refrain from releasing confidential
information if the lawyer becomes aware that the carrier is send-
ing legal bills to an auditor."1 Similarly, the District of Columbia
opinion stated:
Prior to disclosure of protected information to the insurer
... the lawyer should instruct the insurer not to release the
protected information and should designate all such infor-
mation clearly. If there is reason to believe that the insurer
will not follow this instruction, the lawyer should so advise
the client, prior to disclosure, explaining any additional
risks that would result from disclosure by the insurer to a
third party.8
2
Of course, such an admonition is likely to strain relations
between the insurer and the insured and to jeopardize the attor-
ney's retention of the account. It is no wonder that one insur-
ance defense attorney has described this option as a bitter pill. 3
Although all of the ethics opinions warn attorneys to refrain
from disclosing confidential client information to auditors, they
78. See Va., supra note 1. The Virginia opinion hypothesized a situation in
which insurance carriers required "the attorney to submit billing statements
directly to outside auditing firms for review and approval," even though the
insureds had "no knowledge of this submission." Id.
79. See Cooley, supra note 28.
80. See id.
81. See Md., supra note 1.
82. D.C., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.dcbar.org/
attorney.resources/opin290.pdf.
83. See Cooley, supra note 28, at 53 ("None of us is happy sending strident
letters to an insurance company demanding it stop sending your billing state-
ments to a third party. But it must be done, no matter how bitter the pill.").
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vary in the extent to which they warn that the bills are likely to
contain confidential information. The state ethics opinions are
generally based on the assumption that the legal bills disclosed to
the auditor would contain confidential information. For exam-
ple, the Maryland and Virginia opinions explicitly presuppose
that bills sent to auditors will contain confidential information.8 4
The hypothetical billing statements in the Virginia opinion pro-
vided detailed descriptions of the attorney's work for the insured,
including information regarding what was discussed in the office
and by whom, specific issues researched, specific non-deposition
discovery prepared, specific trial work performed, and the iden-
tity of all materials and documents reviewed. 5 Hypothetical
auditors also requested that the attorney attach all his work prod-
uct to the billing statements, and information regarding the
amount of the last settlement offer made prior to suit and the
attorney's estimate of the insured's percentage or degree of
exposure."6
Some of the state ethics opinions have suggested that the
mere fact that an insured has obtained legal assistance might
constitute a client confidence. 7 In defending the reasonable-
ness of this contention, one insurance defense attorney has
contended:
Even in routine automobile accident suits, most people are
reluctant to let others know they have been sued. In some
areas-like professional malpractice-there may be serious
complications to advertising a lawsuit. It doesn't matter
that the lawsuit is a matter of "public record." The bottom
line is that the mere identity of your client is probably a
client secret. 8
8
Even those opinions that do not seem to contend that bills
are rife with confidences have warned that the trend toward
more detailed bills inevitably increases the likelihood that bills
will contain client confidences. The Kentucky Bar Association's
84. The Maryland opinion declared that "[i]t appears obvious, and this
Committee will presume, that the detailed billing and supplemental informa-
tion which the auditor requests will require" disclosure of confidential informa-
tion about the insured. Md., supra note 1. Similarly, the Virginia opinion
stated that an attorney's transmission of billing information to auditors "would
involve disclosure of confidential information regarding both the facts of the
insured's case and the attorney's representation of that insured." Va., supra
note 1.
85. See Va., supra note 1.
86. See id.
87. See Md., supra note 1; Wash., supra note 1; Vt., supra note 1.
88. Cooley, supra note 28, at 20.
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opinion on the use of auditors pointed out that many legal bills,
at least in insurance cases, "are now quite detailed, and contain
information about the nature of the legal services performed,
information about legal research conducted, and information
which could contain strategic decisions made regarding the han-
dling of the case."89 Similarly, the Indiana opinion found that an
increasing number of insurance carriers require the billing attor-
ney to identify the parties with whom the attorney communicates
by telephone or letter, describe the subjects of legal research,
and include in bills the names of witnesses interviewed or experts
consulted. 90
In fixating on the need to protect client confidences, these
ethics opinions ignore other ethical obligations of attorneys
toward their clients and other ideals which the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct are designed to facilitate. For example,
Rule 1.5(a), which provides that a "lawyer's fee shall be reason-
able," is advanced by both audits and guidelines; indeed, the
comment to Rule 1.5 explains that a lawyer "should defer to the
client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred."'"
Similarly, audits help to assure that "a lawyer shall not make a
false or misleading communication" concerning her services, as
prohibited by Rule 7.1.92 Audits also help to prevent the type of
"dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation" which Rule
8.4(c) prohibits. 3 Likewise, billing guidelines generally contain
provisions which help to assure that a "lawyer shall keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information," as required by
Rule 1.4(a).94
The opinions have generally agreed that an attorney could
submit bills to legal auditors if the bills did not contain client
confidences. For example, the Oregon opinion stated that if "a
detailed bill contains no confidences or secrets" of a client, the
attorney could properly submit the client's "detailed bills to the
third-party audit service," but that such submission would be
improper "if a detailed bill contains confidences or secrets."9 5
The New York opinion stated:
89. Ky., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.uky.edu/Law/
kyethics/kba404.htm>.
90. See Ind., supra note 1.
91. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 & cmt. (1998).
92. Id. Rule 7.1.
93. Id. Rule 8.4(c).
94. Id. Rule 1.4(a).
95. Or., supra note 1, 1999 WL 521543, at *1.
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Although not every individual bill, and not every particular
item of information contained in supporting documenta-
tion, will itself comprise a "secret" or "confidence" of the
insured who is the client, much of the information con-
tained in a defense lawyer's bills and related records will
constitute a "secret of a client," if not a confidence. 96
As is explained in detail below in Part 111(D), there are many
ways in which attorneys can ensure that bills submitted to outside
auditors do not contain client confidences. Even if the bills con-
tained confidences, however, the submission of the bills to the
auditors would not necessarily violate any ethical rule since the
auditors could be regarded as agents of the insurance companies
or the attorneys.
The ethics opinions generally overlook the fact that insur-
ance defense attorneys routinely share client confidences with a
wide array of third parties. The need for attorneys to protect
client confidences in communications with agents is tacitly recog-
nized in Model Rule 5.3, which requires attorneys to "make rea-
sonable efforts to ensure that" the agent's "conduct is compatible
with the professional obligations" of the attorney."7 An ABA eth-
ics opinion has indicated that a lawyer could properly provide a
computer maintenance company with access to information in
client files, provided that the lawyer made reasonable efforts to
ensure the confidentiality of client information. 8 In its opinion,
the ABA committee acknowledged that it was "aware that lawyers
now use outside agencies for numerous functions such as
accounting, data processing and storage, printing, photocopying,
computer servicing, and paper disposal."9 9  The opinion
explained that "[s]uch use of outside service providers .. . inevi-
tably entails giving them access to client files[, ... thus] trig-
ger[ing] the application of Rule 5.3."1°0
96. N.Y., supra note 1, 1999 WL 221884, at *2; see also id.:
Billing records typically contain "secrets" within the meaning of DR 4-
101(A) [the New York version of Rule 1.6]. That is because they
almost invariably include information "gained in the professional rela-
tionship" with the client; often, this will be information that the client
would want to be held inviolate or that, if disclosed, would be embar-
rassing or detrimental to the client. ...
97. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.3 (1998).
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Similarly, submission of bills to an auditor by an insurance
company should not create any ethical problem for insurance
defense attorneys. Professor Stephen Gillers has pointed out:
[A]n insurer's decision to give the independent contractor
access to the insured's confidential information to assist it
in exercising its contractual right to control the defense
should stand on no different footing from a law firm's deci-
sion to give an independent contractor access to a much
greater volume of confidential information to aid it in rep-
resenting clients.' 01
Professor Gillers has aptly concluded:
[Even though] the duties of insurers and lawyers emanate
from different sources . . ., [an attorney's] duties with
regard to client information are at least as stringent if not
more so than insurers' duties, yet the ABA has recognized
the legitimacy of law firms giving independent contractors
access to extensive confidential information with appropri-
ate safeguards. There is no doctrinal difference here.10 2
As agents of insurance companies, legal auditing companies
can be expected to protect any confidences of policy holders that
might be included in the bills that they review. An auditor would
certainly have no reason to betray such a confidence. On the
contrary, the auditor's own interest would encourage it to avoid
the disclosure of confidential information to third parties. Simi-
larly, there is no empirical reason to fear that legal auditors may
be forced to involuntarily disclose confidences. One leading
legal auditor reports that his firm, which reviews an average of
forty thousand legal bills each month from six thousand law
firms, has never in its ten years of operation _, eceived even one
discovery request or subpoena for production of billing
records. 
03
C. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
Even though Rule 1.6 goes beyond the attorney-client privi-
lege, the danger that legal audits might waive the attorney-client
privilege nevertheless may be presumed to be a major considera-
tion in the state ethics opinions, although these decisions do not
101. Stephen Gillers, Ethical Issues in Monitoring Insurance Defense Fees:
Confidentiality, Privilege and Billing Guidelines (visited Feb. 20, 2000) http://tarl-
ton.law.utexas.edu/silver/gil.htm.
102. Id.
103. See interview with Jed Ringel, President, Law Audit Services (Feb. 11,
2000). Mr. Ringel says that he has never heard of any other legal audit firm that
has received such discovery requests.
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purport to directly answer the question of whether submission of
the legal bills to the auditors would waive the attorney-client priv-
ilege."0 4 Some, however, appear to assume that the privilege
would not extend to outside auditors.'0 5 Accordingly, it may be
useful to consider the extent to which audits may compromise
the privilege.
The attorney-client privilege protects communications
between an attorney, made in confidence, for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice or services from the attorney.' °6 The privi-
104. As the Louisiana committee explained, "[w]hether or not the pro-
viding of the bills to the auditing company constitutes a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege is a legal question which the committee may not answer." La.,
supra note 1. Similarly, the Oregon opinion states that "[i]n the absence of
definitive Oregon authority, whether the submission to a third-party audit ser-
vice of bills containing Client's confidences and secrets waives the attorney-cli-
ent privilege or work-product doctrine is a matter of substantive law beyond the
scope of this opinion." Or., supra note 1, 1999 WL 521543, at *2. See also Mass.,
supra note 1; ("whether the subject of the communication with your client is
protected by the attorney-client privilege is a question of substantive law which
the Committee's rules do not permit it to address"); N.Y., supra note 1, 1999 WL
221884, at *3 ("The question of whether disclosing a document would explicitly
or implicitly reveal attorney-client privileged communications is a question of
evidence law that ordinarily calls for fact-specific determination.").
105. Although the Indiana opinion indicated that waiver of the attorney
attorney-client and work-product privileges were "fact-sensitive, legal" issues
about which it could offer no opinion, it also expressed the opinion that the
attorney-client "privilege would not appear to extend to an independent audit-
ing company, which, of course, has no contractual relationship with or duty to
defend the insured client." Ind., supra note 1. Similarly, the District of Colum-
bia opinion stated that "where applicable law affords privileged status to com-
munications among the insurer, insured and the insured's attorney, disclosure
by the insurer to a third party could effectively waive the privilege." D.C., supra
note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.dcbar.org/attorneyresources/
opin290.pdf>. In its opinion on billing guidelines, the Iowa ethics board stated:
[I]t would be improper for an Iowa lawyer to agree to, accept or follow
...proposed service-log requirements in any form that causes the
attorney-client privilege to be placed in jeopardy, if the service-log is
sent to a third party. An Insurer may require a lawyer to identify the
services rendered and time spent, so long as it does not control the
lawyer's professional judgment or undermine the attorney-client
privilege.
Iowa, supra note 2, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.iowabar.org/ethics.nsf/
e61beed77a215f6686256497004ce492/b662fde548eef686862567e80053fa52!
OpenDocument>.
106. The elements of the privilege have generally been described as
follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at
his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or
by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
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lege does not protect communications which are made primarily
for a business purpose rather than primarily for a legal
purpose.
10 7
Although the distinction between business advice and legal
advice is not always easy to draw since business advice and legal
advice are often intertwined, courts have indicated that the pri-
mary or predominate purpose of a communication must relate to
legal advice in order for the privilege to attach. 108 As one court
has explained, "if the lawyer is serving as a business representa-
tive of his client, those functions that he performs purely in that
capacity-such as negotiation of the provisions of a business con-
tract or relationship-are not the source of a privilege."'0 9
A client's voluntary disclosure to third persons of confiden-
tial information that is protected by the attorney-client privilege
"has long been considered inconsistent with maintaining [the]
privilege."'110 Accordingly, disclosure of legal bills to an outside
auditor could waive the privilege to the extent that auditors were
regarded as third parties and to the extent that such bills con-
tained confidential information.
Attorney billing records are protected by the attorney-client
privilege only to the extent that they would tend to reveal confi-
dential information."' As the First Circuit stated in a recent
opinion, " [w] e certainly agree that ... documents are not per se
non-privileged merely because they were intended primarily for
billing purposes."" 2 Accordingly, the privilege protects billing
records that would disclose the nature of the services of the attor-
See United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1461 (7th Cir :997) (citing 8 JOHN
HENRY WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRIMs AT COMMON LAW g 2292 (1961)).
107. See, e.g., In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 603 (4th Cir. 1997); Marten v.
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-2013-GTV, 1998 WL 13244, at *7 (D.
Kan. Jan. 6, 1998); Georgia Pac. Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 Civ.
5125 (RPP), 1996 WL 29392, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996).
108. See, e.g., Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 930 F. Supp. 36, 43 (D. Conn.
1996); United States v. Chevron Corp., No. C-94-1885 SBA, 1996 WL 264769, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1996); McCaugherty v. Sifferman, 132 F.R.D. 234, 238
(N.D. Cal. 1990).
109. Note Funding Corp. v. Bobian Inv. Co., No. 93 Civ. 7427 (DAB),
1995 WL 662402, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1995).
110. United States v. South Chicago Bank, No. 97 CR 849-1, 97 CR 849-2,
1998 WL 774001, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 1998).
111. See United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., 885 F. Supp. 672, 675
(M.D. Pa. 1994); Old Holdings, Ltd. v. Taplin, Howard, Shaw & Miller, 584 So.
2d 1128, 1128-29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
112. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 123 F.3d 695, 699 (1st Cir. 1997)
(remanding for determination of whether billing records were privileged).
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ney or the type of work performed by the attorney. 1 ' Similarly,
the privilege prevents disclosure of billing records which would
reveal the content of discussions between an attorney and
client." 14
In contrast, billing records which merely reveal the amount
of time spent or billed and the character of the fee arrangement
are generally discoverable. 15  As the Ninth Circuit has
explained:
The identity of the client, the amount of the fee, the iden-
tification of payment by case file name, and the general
purpose of the work performed are usually not protected
from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege .... How-
ever, correspondence, bills, ledgers, statements, and time
records which also reveal the motive of the client in seek-
ing representation, litigation strategy, or the specific
nature of the services provided, such as researching partic-
ular areas of law, fall within the privilege.
1 16
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that legal bills that
showed the identity of the client, the case name for which pay-
ment was rendered, the amount of the fee, and the general
nature of the services performed did not constitute privileged
information.1 1 7 Similarly, another federal court has stated that
"[i] t is generally accepted... that attorney billing statements and
time records are protected by the attorney-client privilege only to
the extent that they reveal litigation strategy and/or the nature
of services performed."'1 8
Likewise, a NewJersey court has held that the attorney-client
privilege did not prevent a police union from using a right-to-
know law to obtain bills which attorneys submitted to a munici-
pality. 9 The court explained:
113. See C.J. Calamia Constr. Co. v. Ardco/Traverse Lift Co., No. Civ. A.
97-2770, 1998 WL 395130, at *2 (E.D. La. July 14, 1998).
114. See DiPalma v. Medical Mavin, Ltd., No. Civ. A. 95-8094, 1998 WL
123009, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 1998).
115. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 354 (4th Cir. 1994);
C.j Calamia, 1998 WL at *2; Beavers v. Hobbs, 176 F.R.D. 562, 564-65 (S.D. Iowa
1997); Tipton v. Barton, 747 S.W.2d 325, 332 (Mo. App. 1988).
116. Clarke v. American Comm. Nat'l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir.
1992).
117. See id. at 130.
118. Leach v. Quality Health Servs., 162 F.R.D. 499, 501 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(citing United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., 885 F. Supp. 672, 675 (M.D.
Pa. 1994)).
119. See Hunterdon County Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n. Local 188 v.
Township of Franklin, 669 A.2d 299, 302 (N.J. 1996).
20001
552 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
The billings of an attorney are not likely to contain infor-
mation which is confidential. In the experience of this
court, it will contain a few word description of the general
category of work performed, the number of hours
required to perform the work, the date of the perform-
ance, and the total cost to the client.
120
In concluding that legal bills do not necessarily contain priv-
ileged information, the Nebraska ethics opinion relied in part
upon the Ninth Circuit's decision in Clarke in concluding that
legal "bills are not privileged information" and that their submis-
sion by an insurer to an outside auditor does not necessarily con-
stitute a violation of an attorney's duty to maintain client
confidences. 2
1
This opinion may have gone too far, however. As the Dis-
trict of Columbia opinion pointed out, the question of whether a
bill reveals client confidences depends upon the precise wording
of the bill. As this opinion explained, " [w] hile some billing state-
ments may not reflect protected information, at least some of the
information described by the inquirer clearly falls within the pro-
tection of Rule 1.6."1122 The material described by the inquirer
had involved "the content of all communications (telephone
calls, correspondence, meetings), specific issues researched, the
specified trial preparation performed, and the identity of mate-
rial or documents reviewed and written work product generated
in the representation of the client."'
2 3
Similarly, the New York opinion correctly observed that "the
extent to which billing records are protected by the attorney-cli-
ent privilege would require carefully analyzing the records line
by line."'124 The opinion explained:
In general, decisions have recognized that legal bills ordi-
narily are not privileged insofar as they contain only the
identity of the client, the fee amount, and the general
nature of the services rendered, but that the attorney-client
privilege would protect correspondence, bills, ledgers,
statements and time records insofar as they reveal the
motive of the client in seeking representation, litigation
120. Id.
121. Neb., supra note 1.
122. D.C., supra note 1.
123. Id.
124. N.Y., supra note 1, 1999 WL 221884, at *3.
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strategy, or the specific nature of the services provided,
such as researching particular areas of law.
1 25
Similarly, the Washington ethics opinion warned:
Payment for professional services is based on "adequate
descriptions" contained in the billing statement. "Ade-
quate descriptions" often require the identity of all partici-
pants in, and the purpose of, a conference, letter, call or
meeting; the specific issues involved; and specific informa-
tion about the nature of what has been discussed, reviewed
or decided which may require disclosure of specific or tac-
tical and strategic information about the defense of litiga-
tion irrespective of whether the information is otherwise
privileged, embarrassing to the client, or may involve mat-
ters of dispute between the client and the insurer . .126
Although it therefore appears that the attorney-client privi-
lege protects at least some legal bills that insurance defense
counsel might submit to outside auditors, the transmission of
such information would not waive the privilege because the audi-
tors are the agents of the insured and the insurer. It is well-estab-
lished law that the attorney-client privilege protects the
confidentiality of communications between an attorney and the
agents of the attorney. 127 The privilege clearly applies to
subordinate agents such as student clerks, paralegals, secretaries,
and investigators.1 21 Similarly, the privilege also extends to com-
munications by an attorney with retained experts. 1
29
As the Second Circuit explained in the leading case of United
States v. Kovel,130 "the complexities of modern existence prevent
attorneys from effectively handling clients' affairs without the
help of others; few lawyers could now practice without the assist-
ance of secretaries, file clerks, telephone operators, messengers,
clerks not yet admitted to the bar, and aides of other sorts."
13 1
The court in Kovel therefore endorsed Professor Wigmore's con-
tention that "[t] he assistance of these agents being indispensable
125. Id. (citing Clarke v. American Comm. Nat'l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129
(9th Cir. 1992); Licensing Corp. of Am. v. Nat'l Hockey League Players Ass'n.,
153 Misc.2d 126, 127-28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992)).
126. Wash., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.wsba.org/
bog/pres/fo/fo195.html>.
127. See, e.g., PAUL R. RICE, ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED
STATES 334 (1993).
128. See, e.g., EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND
THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 106-09 (3d ed. 1997).
129. See id. at 109-15.
130. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
131. Id. at 921.
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to [the attorney's] work and the communications of the client
being often necessarily committed to them by the attorney or by
the client himself, the privilege must include, all persons who act
as the attorney's agent." 32 Accordingly, the court in Kovel held
that the privilege extended to communications made by a client
to an accountant in an attorney's employ. 3 The court likened
the work of the accountant to that of a translator of a foreign
language.1 34
The court in Kovel emphasized:
What is vital to the privilege is that the communication be
made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice from the lawyer. If what is sought is not legal advice
but only accounting service .. .or if the advice sought is
the accountant's rather than the lawyer's, no privilege
exists.13 5
Accordingly, courts have applied the privilege to communica-
tions with agents who were consulted in connection with litiga-
tion. l13 In other cases, courts have refused to recognize the
privilege when outside consultants have performed businessfunctions that were not closely related to litigation.137
132. Id. (citing WIGMoRE, supra note 104, at § 2301; Annotation, Persons
Other Than Client or Attorney Rendered Incompetent by the Privilege Attaching to Com-
munications Between Client and Attorney, 53 A.L.R. 369 (1928)).
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. Id at 922.
136. See Carter v. Cornell Univ., No. 97-9180, 1998 WL 537842, at *2 (2d
Cir.July 9, 1998) (dean employed by defendant university was acting as agent of
defendant's attorney when she conducted interviews of university employees in
connection with the litigation); Compulit v. Banctec, Inc., 177 F.R.D. 410, 413
(W.D. Mich. 1997) (law firm did not necessarily waive its client's privilege by
contracting with an independent contractor that provided litigation support
services); H.W. Carter & Sons v. William Carter Co., No. 95 Civ. 1274 (DC),
1995 WL 301351, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995) (privilege was not lost when
public relations consultant participated in discussions between attorney and
defendant to formulate response to plaintiffs lawsuit).
137. In one recent case, for example, a federal court held that an engi-
neering consultant hired by a chemical corporation to work on an environmen-
tal cleanup project was not an agent or representative of the corporation's
attorney for purposes of the privilege with respect to documents prepared by
the consultant. See Occidental Chem. Corp. v. OHM Remediation Servs. Corp.,
175 F.R.D. 431, 436-38 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). The court explained that documents
prepared by the consultant were not privileged even if they were prepared dur-
ing negotiations to settle legal matters because the consultant was hired to for-
mulate a remediation plan rather than to put information into a usable form
for attorneys to render legal advice, and because assistance provided by the
consultants was obtained through studies and observations of the cleanup site
rather than through client confidences. See id. at 437.
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No court appears to have directly addressed the question of
whether a client would waive the attorney-client privilege by sub-
mitting its legal bills to an independent agency that reviews legal
bills.13 In the most closely analogous decision, a federal court in
1979 held that an Indian tribe did not waive work-product pro-
tection by disclosing legal bills to the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) in connection with BIA's review procedure for approval of
the bills."3 9 Although this decision has been heavily relied upon
by the respondents in the Montana case, 1 40 it may be distinguish-able to the extent that the BIA acted "as confidential agent for
In another case, a court refused to extend the privilege to police officers'
conversations with a union representative for the purpose of helping the repre-
sentative provide advice about the officers' rights and options, including their
right to consult an attorney. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 995 F. Supp. 332,
338-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). The court stated that it was "simply not prepared to
extend the attorney-client privilege to those conversations a person may have
with a third party whether a union representative, a parent, a trusted teacher,
or a close friend-in seeking that party's guidance about a potential legal prob-
lem or assistance in procuring a lawyer." Id. at 338-39; accord In re E.I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 918 F. Supp. 1524, 1547-48 (M.D. Ga. 1995); rev'd on other
grounds, 99 F.3d 363 (l1th Cir. 1996) (data from tests performed by an
independent laboratory hired by a defendant in a products liability action was
not protected from disclosure); Massachusetts Sch. of Law v. American Bar
Ass'n, 895 F. Supp. 88, 90-91 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (privilege did not apply to consult-
ant who was hired to help law school obtain accreditation because he was not
acting as a lawyer and his communications were not exchanged for a legal pur-
pose); United States Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156,
161 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (outside scientific consultants hired by corporate vendor of
property to conduct environmental studies of soil, oversee remedial work on
property, and develop supplemental remedial program were not attorney's
agents for purposes of the privilege); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Forma-
Pack, 718 A.2d 1129, 1141-42 (Md. 1998) (attorney-client privilege did not
apply to communications between the legal department of a corporation and a
collection agency which was not comprised of attorneys, for purposes of con-
ducting collection efforts through a business approach which did not involve
litigation).
138. In a recent concurring and dissenting opinion concerning the cir-
cumstances under which an insurance company's influence over an attorney
can call into question the attorney's professional responsibilities toward a cli-
ent, ajustice of the Supreme Court of Texas remarked that "[s]ome insurance
companies impose billing restrictions and subject the lawyers to billing audits.
These audits threaten the attorney-client privilege. Some companies even dic-
tate whether an attorney or a paralegal does some of the work." State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625, 634 (Tex. 1998) (Gonzalez, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (discussing circumstances under which an insur-
ance company's influence over an attorney can call into question the attorney's
professional responsibilities to a client).
139. See Indian Law Resource Ctr. v. Department of Interior, 477 F. Supp.
144, 148 (D. D.C. 1979).
140. SeeJoint Brief of Respondents at 18, In re Prof'I Conduct & Insurer-
Imposed Billing Rules & Procedures, No. 98-612 (Mont. filed Nov. 4, 1998).
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the tribe.' 41 Numerous decisions in which courts have held that
disclosure of privileged information to an auditor has waived the
attorney-client privilege 4 ' do appear to be distinguishable, how-
ever, from the situation in which an insurance company asks an
outside auditor to review legal bills.
In support of their application for ajudgment declaring that
outside auditing of insurance defense attorneys' bills constitutes
an ethical violation, petitioners in the Montana case have relied
heavily upon the First Circuit's recent decision in United States v.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.143 That case is distinguishable
because a potentially adversarial relationship existed between
MIT and its auditor, a governmental agency.
In the Massachusetts Institute of Technology case, MIT submit-
ted legal bills related to government defense contracts to the
Defense Contract Audit Agency, the auditing arm of the Depart-
ment of Defense, in compliance with those contracts in order for
the government to determine whether MIT had overcharged the
government. 44  When the Internal Revenue Service later
attempted to obtain the legal bills from the auditor in connec-
tion with an investigation of MIT's tax-exempt status, MIT
refused to consent to the disclosure, arguing that the attorney-
client privilege protected their confidentiality. 145  MIT con-
tended that its disclosure of the legal bills to the audit agency was
"akin to the disclosure by a client's lawyer to another lawyer rep-
resenting another client in a common defense," a recognized
exception to waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 146  In
rejecting this argument, the court pointed out that there was no
common interest because "MIT's disclosure to the audit agency
was a disclosure to a potential adversary."
147
141. Indian Law Resource Ctr., 477 F. Supp. at 148.
142. See United States v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 683-
87 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 (2d Cir. 1995);
In reJohn Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 488-89 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v.
South Chicago Bank, No. 97 CR 849-1, 97 CR 849-2, 1998 WL 774001, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 1998); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Willkie Farr &
Gallagher, No. M8-85 (ISM), 1997 WL 118369, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1997).
143. See Petitioner's Memorandum at 29-33, In re Rules of Prof'l Conduct
& Insurer-Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures, No. 98-612 (Mont. filed Nov.
4, 1998) (discussing United States v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 129 F.3d
681 (1st Cir. 1997)).
144. See Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 683.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 685.
147. Id. at 687. Although the court acknowledged that MIT and the audit
agency may have shared a common interest to the extent that they were both
interested in the "proper performance of MIT's defense contracts and the
proper auditing and payment of MIT's bills," the court explained that "this is
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In discussing the scope of the attorney-client privilege, the
court reaffirmed that attorneys may share confidential informa-
tion with agents without sacrificing the privilege. 4 ' Moreover,
the court pointed out that communications between insured and
insurer are one example of a situation in which "disclosure has
been allowed, without forfeiting the privilege, among separate
parties similarly aligned in a case or consultation." 4 9 As Dean
Syverud has argued, Massachusetts Institute of Technology therefore
"actually supports insurers' use of outside auditors, because dis-
closure of billing information is necessary to facilitate the
insured's representation and because the insurer and the
insured have a common interest in efficient, cost-effective and
appropriate representations."1 0
The recent decision of the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois in South Chicago Bank is distinguishable
because information for which the privilege was waived had been
submitted to the auditors in connection with a routine year-end
audit rather than in connection with the company's efforts to
not the kind of common interest to which the cases refer in recognizing that
allied lawyers and clients-who are working together in prosecuting or defend-
ing a lawsuit or in certain other legal transactions-can exchange information
among themselves without loss of the privilege." Id. at 685. The court stated
that "[t]o extend the notion to MIT's relationship with the audit agency, which
on another level is easily characterized as adversarial, would be to dissolve the
boundary almost entirely." Id.
148. See id. at 684. Although the First Circuit observed that the case law
involving waiver occurring as the result of "a deliberate and voluntary disclosure
of a privileged communication to someone other than the attorney or client" is
"far from settled," the court explained that "decisions do tend to mark out,
although not with perfect consistency, a small circle of 'others' with whom
information may be shared without loss of the privilege (e.g., secretaries, inter-
preters, counsel for a cooperating co-defendant, a parent present when a child
consults a lawyer)." Id.
The court further explained:
Athough the decisions often describe such situations as ones in which
the client "intended" the disclosure to remain confidential . . . the
underlying concern is functional: that the lawyer be able to consult
with others needed in the representation and that the client be
allowed to bring closely related persons who are appropriate, even if
not vital, to consultation .... An intent to maintain confidentiality is
ordinarily necessary to continued protection, but it is not sufficient.
Id. According to the court, "where the client chooses to share communications
outside this magic circle, the courts have usually refused to extend the privi-
lege." Id.
149. Id. at 685.
150. Kent D. Syverud, The Ethics of Insurer Litigation Management Guidelines
and Legal Audits, INS. DEF. RPTR., May 1, 1999, at 180; see also Anderson, supra
note 38.
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obtain legal advice.151 The court indicated, however, that infor-
mation provided to the auditor in connection with a legal mat-
ter-an investigation of employee fraud-remained privileged to
the extent that it was not shared with the auditors who were con-
ducting the year-end audit.152 The Second Circuit's decisions in
two other recent decisions are distinguishable because the court
in those cases found that the communications involved business
advice rather than legal advice.15 Moreover, the decision of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in another recent decision appears to be distinguishable
because the court stated that the company in that case had made
a "strategic decision to waive the privilege" in order to obtain a
qualified audit opinion. 15 4
Taken together, these decisions suggest that the privilege
would not be waived if a client communicates with a non-adver-
sarial outside auditor in connection with efforts to obtain legal
advice rather than business advice. The submission of bills to an
auditor, however, appears to fall in a murky zone between legal
advice and business advice. The legal bills themselves were gen-
erated, of course, in connection with the client's quest for legal
advice. But the legal advice has already been rendered by the
time that the bill is sent to the auditor, and one could argue that
the principal purpose of the audit is to enable the company to
make a business decision about how much of the attorney's bill it
151. See United States v. South Chicago Bank, No. 97 CR 849-1, 97 CR
849-2, 1998 WL 774001, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 1998) (explaining that "the
bank's year-end audit team . . .was outside the circle of persons with whom
confidential information could be shared because they were performing work
in the ordinary course of business, not for the sake of legal advice").
152. See id.
153. See United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495 (2d Cir. 1995); In reJohn
Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982). In Adiman, the Second Circuit held
that the privilege did not extend to communications between a corporation
and the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen, which had advised in-house coun-
sel of the tax consequences of a proposed merger, insofar as the taxpayer rather
than inside counsel had contacted the firm and the taxpayer regularly
employed Arthur Andersen to provide routine accounting, auditing, and advi-
sory services. The court explained that these facts suggested that the company
contacted Arthur Andersen for business-related advice rather than for legal
advice. See AdIman, 68 F.3d at 1500. The court pointed out that Arthur Ander-
sen's "billing statements lump the work done in this consultation together with
its other accounting and advisory services." Id. In John Doe, the court explained
that "this particular conversation was sparked by Accountant's responsibilities
in conducting the audit, not by [the] seeking of legal advice requiring the aid
of an accountant." John Doe, 675 F.2d at 488.
154. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Willkie Farr & Gallagher,
No. M8-85 (JSM), 1997 WL 118369, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1997).
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should have to pay. It is therefore not entirely clear that the
attorney-client privilege would protect such communications.
Even if the privilege did not protect such communications,
however, the transmission of such communications to the
outside auditor in most instances would not prejudice the client
because most of the information that attorneys typically include
in billing entries would not be so confidential that it would bene-
fit an adversary. Although some billing entries include informa-
tion that could help an adversary, an attorney who believes that
the attorney-client privilege would not protect the bill could
refrain from writing prejudicial entries, or could redact such
entries from the bills sent to the auditor. 155 Moreover, as is
explained in greater detail below, the attorney could also avoid
ethical violations by obtaining the informed consent of the client
to the disclosure.
Finally, the work product rule presumably would protect bill-
ing information even if the attorney-client privilege were not
available, since virtually any insurance defense bill concerns
information about actual or anticipated litigation.156 Since work
product protection is waived only by disclosure to an adversary of
the party for whom the work product was created, disclosure to a
legal auditor would not waive work product protection because
the auditor is not an adversary. The Colorado opinion acknowl-
edged that "[a] rguably, the third party auditor, as the insurer's
agent, could fall within... the protection" of the work product
rule.157 The work-product issue was also addressed briefly in the
Indiana opinion, which expressed concern that disclosure of
"such detailed descriptions of legal services likely would describe
'mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories' of
defense counsel, subjects which ordinarily are protected from
disclosure by the work-product privilege."15 The opinion, how-
ever, stated that "[w]aiver is a fact-sensitive, legal issue" about
which it could not opine. 1 59
D. Means of Avoiding Disclosure of Confidential Information
Even if the disclosure of certain types of billing information
to auditors would result in the waiver of the attorney-client privi-
155. See infra Pt. III(D)(3).
156. See Statement of Geoffrey C. Hazard, In re Rules of Prof'l Conduct &
Insurer-Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures, No. 98-612 (Mont. filed Nov. 4,
1998) [hereinafter Hazard] (on file with author).
157. Colo., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.cobar.org/
comms/ethics/fo/fo_107.htm> (citation omitted).
158. Ind., supra note 1 (citation omitted).
159. Id.
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lege or otherwise would compromise the confidentiality of client
confidences, there are a number of means by which insurance
defense attorneys can avoid the violation of any rules of profes-
sional responsibility or any other obligation to insureds.
1. Consent of the Insured
The state ethics opinions generally agree that attorneys
would not breach any confidence if the attorney submits bills to
an auditor with the consent of the insured rather than solely at
the direction of the insurance company. 60 Such consent pre-
sumably would be required pursuant to Model Rule 1.4(b),
which states that "[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed deci-
sions regarding the representation."' 61 Informed consent also is
mandated by Rule 1.2(a), which provides that "[a] lawyer shall
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of repre-
sentation ... and shall consult with the client as to the means by
which they are to be pursued."' 62 The comment to Rule 1.2(a)
states that "the lawyer shall defer to the client regarding such
questions as the expense to be incurred."' 63 Such consent, of
course, must be voluntary and informed.
The state ethics opinions differ widely in their assessment of
the extent to which attorneys are likely to be able to obtain
informed consents to audits, and the procedures by which such
consent could be obtained. Although insurance policies typically
provide that carriers shall direct the defense of insureds, the state
ethics opinions generally assume that such general consent
would be insufficient for the attorney to satisfy his ethical obliga-
tion to the insured. The Indiana opinion explained, for exam-
ple, that "since the provision of such detailed information is not
necessary to carry out the representation, there does not exist an
160. See, e.g., Fla., supra note 1; N.Y., supra note 1; S.C., supra note 1. The
Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Washington opinions, however, indi-
cate that an attorney could not properly obtain consent. See infra notes 189-97
and accompanying text.
161. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1998). More-
over, the Restatement (Second) of Agency provides:
An agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to give his princi-
pal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him and
which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to have and
which can be communicated without violating a superior duty to a
third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958).
162. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rulel.2(a) (1998).
163. Id. cmt.
AN IRONIC AND UNNECESSARY CONTROVERSY
implied authorization to reveal such information to others."' 64
The Florida opinion states that an "attorney must inform his cli-
ents, the insureds, of their insurance companies' demands and
restrictions on the attorney in his preparation of the insured's
case. The [attorney] may not follow the insurer's guidelines
without full knowledge and consent of the insured." '65
Accordingly, the ethics opinions have tended to take the
position that informed consent requires explicit rather than
implicit authorization to release billing records to auditors. As
the New York ethics opinion stated, an attorney has a duty to
obtain specific consent from the client even if the insurance con-
tract "might be interpreted implicitly, or even explicitly, to
require the client to disclose certain information to an outside
auditor as a condition of the insurance company's duty to defend
the insured." '66 The New York ethics opinion explained that
"[s] uch a provision in the insurance policy ordinarily would not
constitute 'consent ... after a full disclosure"' within the mean-
ing of the New York ethics code "because it would not have been
preceded by the type of disinterested explanation ... that would
be necessary to make the client's decision fully informed." 67
Similarly, the District of Columbia's opinion concluded that
"[c] onsent to disclose confidences and secrets to the insurer may
not provide a basis to infer consent to disclose the same informa-
tion to another entity who performs work for the insurer" and
that such "consent should not be assumed to include consent to
disclosure to a third party."
' 168
The ethics opinions have emphasized that the elements of
informed consent must be analyzed on a case by case basis.169
The opinions have nevertheless attempted to provide some gen-
eral guidelines. The Maryland opinion indicated that "[t] he law-
yer should inform the client of the types of information that may
be disclosed in any billing records, as well as the potential legal
164. Ind., supra note 1.
165. Fla., supra note 1, available at 17 TRIAL ADvoc. Q, 7, 9 (1998).
166. N.Y., supra note 1, 1999 WL 221884, at *3.
167. Id..
168. D.C., supra note 1.
169. For example, the Maryland opinion stated that "[t]he level of infor-
mation required to obtain consent must be analyzed on a case by case basis."
Md., supra note 1. Similarly, the New York opinion stated that while " [t]he
nature of the necessary disclosure will vary somewhat from case to case and
client to client" and that "it is, therefore, not possible to identify a comprehen-
sive list of specific considerations that the lawyer should bring to the client's
attention and discuss with the client to enable the client to decide whether to
authorize the lawyer to provide documents to the auditor." N.Y., supra note 1,
1999 WL 221884, at *5.
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effects of releasing such information to third parties. ' ' 7  Simi-
larly, the New York opinion advised:
[T] he lawyer should at least discuss the nature of the infor-
mation to be found in the billing records sought by the
auditor as well as the relevant legal and nonlegal conse-
quences of the client's decision. This would include giving
advice concerning the extent of the client's obligation
under the insurance contract to authorize such disclosures
and the risk that the insurance company would refuse to
indemnify the client and to pay the client's attorneys fees if
the client does not consent.1
7 1
Likewise, the South Carolina opinion warned:
Client consent to the release of confidential information
must be informed consent, based upon more than the
mere fact that a certain type of information, such as billing
records, will be released to third parties. Due to the poten-
tial effects of the misuse or abuse of such information, dis-
closure must be full. The lawyer should elaborate on the
type of information which may be found in billing records,
as well as the potential legal effects of releasing such infor-
mation to third parties.1 72
Such potential legal effects presumably would include the use of
such information by the insured's adversary in litigation or in
business competition.
Several of the opinions have also required attorneys to
renew client consent in accordance with changed conditions.173
Moreover, as the New York opinion contends, the client should
be permitted "to revoke the advance consent" even if its "advance
consent to share information with the insurer's auditor was suffi-
ciently informed."'7 4 Similarly, the Utah opinion states that "the
lawyer must consult with the client to make sure that the client
170. Md., supra note 1.
171. N.Y., supra note 1, 1999 WL 221884, at *5. The New York opinion
also stated:
[The lawyer might give] advice concerning the risk that the informa-
tion disclosed to the auditor would be obtained by others directly or
indirectly as a result of the disclosure, the risk that a disclosure will
involve waiver of the lawyer-client privilege, and ultimately, the risk
that a disclosure could be used to the client's disadvantage.
Id.
172. S.C., supra note 1, 1997 WL 861963, at *2.
173. See Wash., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.wsba.
org/bog/pres/fo/fo195.html> (an attorney should "consult with the client
periodically thereafter as circumstances may require").
174. N.Y., supra note 1, 1999 WL 221884, at *3.
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understands and renews the consent" even if the contract pro-
vides for such consent.
1 75
Prudence would seem to require that such consent be in
writing. The Wisconsin opinion has stated that "it is generally
advisable that such consent be in writing," even though this is
"not required." 176 The North Carolina opinion, however, stated
that written consent is not required.1 7
7
Some of the opinions have emphasized that the attorney's
communications with the client are complicated by the potential
conflicts of interest which are inherent in the tripartite relation-
ship among insurers, insureds, and defense counsel. The District
of Columbia's opinion pointed out that "a lawyer may have an
interest in cooperating with the insurance company to preserve
the lawyer's business relationship with the insurance com-
pany." 178 The District of Columbia opinion also warned, how-
ever, that "[t] he lawyer may have a financial interest in avoiding
an audit of his billing practices, and should avoid exaggerating
the risks of disclosure to a client whose consent to disclosure is
sought."'
171
Similarly, the North Carolina opinion states that "[w]ith
respect to the payment of legal fees, the interest of the insurance
company and the insured are usually not the same." ' Accord-
ing to the North Carolina opinion, "[t]he insurance company
usually has an interest in controlling or reducing its defense
costs, while the interest of the insured is generally to receive the
best possible defense particularly if the claim may exceed the pol-
icy limits available for insured's protection."' 8 ' The New York
opinion likewise declared that "the lawyer must avoid being influ-
enced either by the interests of the insurance company, which
may have selected the lawyer, or by those of the lawyer, who may
have an ongoing relationship with the insurance company."182
One obvious problem with "informed consent," is that even
ostensibly "disinterested" advice can be slanted to encourage the
175. Utah, supra note 1, 1998 WL 199533, at *1.
176. Wisc., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.wisbar.org/
ethop/formal/ethics99- .html>.
177. See N.C., supra note 1.
178. D.C., supra note 1.
179. Id.
180. N.C., supra note 1, 1998 WL 609887, at *2.
181. Id.
182. N.Y., supra note 1, 1999 WL 221884, at *5; see also id. (explaining that
"[a]lthough an insurance contract may give the insurer an unfettered right to
control the defense of a claim, the lawyer must exercise independent judgment
on behalf of the client, especially when rendering advice about decisions that
are entrusted to the client").
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client to give consent. One insurance defense attorney has
argued that "a letter explaining the audit procedure, enclosing a
copy of the insurer's guidelines to illustrate what disclosure it
requires, and asking whether the insured has any objection to
the proposed disclosure" might fail to satisfy the lawyer's ethical
obligations because "a benign sounding letter is probably not
going to 'fully inform' the client.""8 3  According to this
commentator:
[A] conservative approach would require that the letter be
alarmist, not benign. The client would have to be
informed that the forwarding of the billing statement to an
outside party could lead to a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege. Since no one knows how the information will be
used by the auditing company, dire predictions would have
to be made. 1
84
He nevertheless acknowledges, however, that "if the lawyer
obtains truly informed consent from the client, there appears to
be no ethical prohibition against sending the billing statements
to a third party."'
1 85
The state ethics opinions have likewise tended to assume
that informed consent will not be easy to obtain because the
insured will not benefit from legal audits. As the North Carolina
opinion explains, an insured who consents to a legal audit
"agrees to release confidential information that could possibly
(even if remotely) be prejudicial to her or invade her privacy
without any return benefit."'86 Similarly, the South Carolina eth-
ics opinion stated that "[a]s a practical matter, achieving ...
informed consent ... is highly problematic.' 87
Indeed, the Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oregon,
and Washington state opinions seem to imply that an attorney
could virtually never obtain the client's informed consent
because the client presumably would not knowingly consent to a
disclosure of information that would contravene its interests.
Accordingly, these opinions have discouraged attorneys from
even trying to obtain the consent of insureds except in the pre-
sumably unlikely event that the attorney has some reason to sup-
183. Cooley, supra note 28, at 21.
184. Id. As examples, Mr. Cooley argues that "a client should be warned
of the possibility that the information sent to the auditor may be used tojustify
a premium rate increase; or it could be shared with other insurance companies
to the detriment of the client if the client wanted to change carriers at some
point." Id.
185. Id.
186. N.C., supra note 1, 1998 WL 609887, at *2.
187. S.C., supra note 1, 1997 WL 861963, at *2.
AN IRONIC AND UNNECESSARY CONT'ROVERSY
pose that disclosure of the bills would be in the insured's best
interests.
For example, the Washington opinion declared that a
requirement by the insurer that defense counsel "seek or obtain
the informed consent of the insured to disclose client confi-
dences or secrets in billings to be submitted to the insurer or its
outside auditing service, would ... place defense counsel in an
impossible situation, requiring withdrawal from representation"
because "it is almost inconceivable that it would ever be in the
client's best interests to disclose confidences or secrets to a third
party. '  The Washington opinion therefore concluded that
defense counsel could ethically obey a carrier's direction to seek
or obtain an insured's consent only "[w]here confidences or
secrets of the client are not revealed in billings."'18 9 Moreover,
the opinion concluded that the attorney must counsel the
insured to withhold consent "[i]f there is the slightest risk of
embarrassment to the client."19
Moreover, the Alabama opinion questioned "whether an
attorney may ethically seek the client's consent if disclosure may
result in a waiver of the client's right to confidentiality, the attor-
ney-client privilege or the work product privilege.""19 Likewise,
the Oregon opinion contended that the prohibition against con-
flicts of interest by attorneys would prohibit an attorney from
seeking client permission to send bills to an auditor under "ordi-
nary circumstances" in which such submission would "create an
actual conflict of interest between insured and insurer."'192
The North Carolina opinion also seemed to express skepti-
cism that an attorney could ever obtain informed consent. After
concluding that the insured ordinarily would have nothing to
gain and would have something to lose from disclosure, the opin-
ion stated that "[w]hen the insured could be prejudiced by
agreeing and gains nothing, a disinterested lawyer would not
conclude that the insured should agree in the absence of some
special circumstance."'193 Accordingly, the North Carolina opin-
ion stated that "the lawyer must reasonably conclude that there is
some benefit to the insured to outweigh any reasonable expecta-
tion of prejudice, or that the insured cannot be prejudiced by a
release of the confidential information, before a lawyer may seek




191. Ala., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.alabar.org/>.
192. Or., supra note 1, 1999 WL 521543, at *2.
193. N.C., supra note 1, 1998 WL 609887, at *2.
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the informed consent of the insured after adequate
consultation. "194
Likewise, the Mississippi opinion warned that "before the
lawyer may seek the informed consent of the insured after ade-
quate consultation, the lawyer must reasonably conclude there is
some benefit to the insured to outweigh any reasonable expecta-
tion of prejudice or that the insured cannot be prejudiced by a
release of the confidential information." '195 This opinion con-
cluded that an attorney for an insured may not seek the
informed consent of an insured to the submission of a legal bill
to an outside auditor "if a disinterested lawyer would conclude that
the client should not agree to such disclosure."' 96
These opinions, however, are unduly restrictive in their con-
cept of informed consent in the context of submission of legal
bills to outside auditors. There is no apparent reason why the
level of disclosure needed for informed consent in this context
should exceed what is required with respect to other aspects of
the attorney's defense of the insured. In its opinion on the ethi-
cal duties owed to insureds by insurance defense attorneys, the
ABA opined that "[w] e presume that in the vast majority of cases
the insured will have no objection to proceeding in accordance
with the terms of his insurance contract.'
9 7
Indeed, the requirements of most of the recent state ethics
opinions greatly exceeded what the ABA ethics committee rec-
ommended in its opinion requiring insurance defense counsel to
explain the nature of their representation to insureds in cases in
which insureds are deemed to be their client.' 98 The ABA opin-
ion concluded that "[a] short letter clearly stating that the lawyer
intends to proceed at the direction of the insurer in accordance
with the terms of the insurance contract and what this means to
the insured is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 1.2 in
this context."' 99 The opinion explained:
194. Id.
195. Miss., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.msbar.org/
opinions/246.html>. The opinion explained that "[t]he primary concern to
the lawyer must be the protection of client confidentiality and the conse-
quences to the client, given the client's informed consent, to the release of
information which may potentially constitute a waiver of the attorney-client or
the work product privileges." Id.
196. Id.
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We do not believe that extended discussion is required or,
indeed, that any oral communication is necessary. As long
as the insured is clearly apprised of the limitations on the
representation being offered by the insurer and that the
lawyer intends to proceed in accordance with the direc-
tions of the insurer, the insured has sufficient information
to decide whether to accept the defense offered by the
insurer or to assume responsibility for his own defense at
his own expense. No formal acceptance or written consent
is necessary. The insured manifests consent to the limited
representation by accepting the defense being offered by
the insurer after being advised of the terms of the repre-
sentation being offered. z0 0
The ABA reached this conclusion even though it acknowledged
that "[w]e cannot assume that the insured understands or
remembers, if he ever read, the insurance policy, or that the
insured understands that his lawyer will be acting on his behalf,
but at the direction of the insurer without further consultation
with the insured.
2 0 1
Similarly, the comment to Rule 1.4 explains that while every
attorney must communicate with clients in a manner that serves
their best interests, "each client will have different levels of will-
ingness, ability, and desire to participate intelligently in the rep-
resentation. '0 2 The comment explains:
These levels are often dependent upon the kind of repre-
sentation. Thus, the guiding principle is contingent upon
the client's reasonable expectation but is limited or
expanded by the client's willingness, ability and desire to
participate in the particular representation, and by the
practicability of the lawyer's meeting the client's
expectations.203
Although the New York opinion acknowledges that "a cli-
ent's desire to take advantage of the insurance company's duty to
defend will heavily influence the client to consent," the opinion
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.4 cmt. (1998); see
also id.:
Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or
assistance involved . . . [but that] . . . [t]he guiding principle under
this Rule is that the lawyer should fulfill the reasonable expectation of
the client for information. In determining what is reasonable, the law-
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properly concludes that "it cannot be concluded that policy-hold-
ers' informed consent to disclose information to insurance com-
panies' auditors will invariably, or even generally, be
involuntary. "204
Only two of the ethics opinions-those of Nebraska and
Massachusetts-have indicated that an attorney would not need
to obtain the independent consent of an insured before sending
legal bills to an outside auditor. The Massachusetts opinion
advised:
To the extent that disclosure to the insurer would be per-
missible (e.g., because the client consents to such disclo-
sure) . . . [an attorney] may make such disclosures to the
auditor so long as . . . [he] satisf[ies] [him]self that the
auditor has taken reasonable steps to protect the confiden-
tiality of the disclosed information. 20 5
The Nebraska opinion did not appear even to require that
the insured consent to disclosure of confidential information to
the insured. As the Nebraska ethics opinion stated, "disclosure
of legal bills by a third party payor of those bills for the client
without any consent is a rather routine matter. This would be
the situation of any audit of the payor by its certified public
accountant. ' 2 6 Moreover, as the Nebraska opinion on legal
auditing pointed out, an attorney does not violate a client confi-
dence by revealing otherwise confidential information about fees
in a lawsuit against a client to collect a fee. 2 7 The Nebraska
Advisory Committee stated that " [w] e see no distinction from the
context of the attorney suing the client to the context of the
insurance company submitting the bill to an audit by an outside
auditor."208
At least two of the opinions have explicitly expressed disa-
greement with the Massachusetts opinion. 2° The District of
Columbia opinion, for example, stated that the District of
Columbia rules contain nothing which would support "the con-
clusion that consent to disclosure to the insurer may be used to
infer consent to disclosure to other third parties whose purpose
it is to assist the insurer in its business, not the attorney in repre-
senting the client's interests."2 10
204. N.Y., supra note 1, 1999 WL 221884, at *4.
205. Mass., supra note 1.
206. Neb., supra note 1.
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. See D.C., supra note 1; Va., supra note 1.
210. D.C., supra note 1.
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Ronald E. Mallen has pointed out that the forms of consent
envisioned by the ethics opinions would entail substantial
costs.211 As Mr. Mallen has observed:
[These requirements] would apply to every routine liability
case, often where the insured has minimal or no involve-
ment in the defense. Because the risk and consequences
of disclosure of confidential information will vary from
case to case, the time required for defense counsel to per-
form this task will be a noticeable entry on the bill. 22
As Mr. Mallen has warned, the duty to evaluate the need for
informed consent with respect to each bill-a responsibility that
some of the ethics opinions seem to impose-could impose sig-
nificant burdens on the lawyer, the insurer, and the insured.213
Although the redrafting of insurance contracts might seem
to provide a means of obviating the need for an endless cycle of
consent, the costs of redrafting and refiling contracts throughout
the United States would itself impose a significant burden on
insurance companies.214 Moreover, since some of the opinions
suggest that insureds must provide informed consent on a case-
by-case basis, the reformulation of insurance policies would not
necessarily liberate attorneys from the strictures of the ethics
opinions.
2. Confidentiality Agreement
In its recent opinion concerning the ethics of an attorney
for an insured submitting legal bills to an agency that reviews
legal bills, the Louisiana State Bar Association's Ethics Advisory
Service Committee recommended "that a confidentiality agree-
ment be signed by the auditing company. '215 Some legal audit
companies already sign such agreements. 21 6 Such an agreement
should make clear that the reviewing agency will maintain the
confidentiality of the bills by not sharing them with anyone who
is not authorized by the agreement to see them or with any other
person or entity who does not need to see the bills in connection
with the services provided by the reviewing agency. A confidenti-
ality agreement should also provide that the agency will take rea-
sonable measures to ensure the confidentiality of the
211. See Ronald E. Mallen, Guidelines or Landmines? Preserving the Tripartite




215. La., supra note 1.
216. See Baker, supra note 1, at 23.
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information. Such measures should include maintenance of the
bills in a secure location and warnings to all persons who see the
bills that they are confidential.
The level of protection that the auditing company accords
to the legal bills may affect the degree to which an attorney may
obtain an insured's informed consent to the release of informa-
tion. In order to successfully obtain informed consent, the
North Carolina opinion advises:
Some of the things that may be necessary for the lawyer to
obtain, consider, and review ... are:
(a) a copy of the agreement between the audit com-
pany and the insurance company;
(b) whether the audit company or the auditor may
use or share the information with any other third party,
including another insurance company;
(c) how the audit company controls access to the
information;
(d) the level of security provided by the audit
company;
(e) how the confidentiality -of the information is
maintained;
(f) the assurances given that the confidentiality of the
information will be maintained; and
(g) the consequences for the client, if the release of
confidential information waives the attorney-client or the
work product privileges.21 7
Similarly, the Pennsylvania opinion stated that an attorney
who seeks to obtain an insured's informed consent must con-
sider the "level of security and confidentiality of the files" as
"[a]ny and all measures taken by Auditor to maintain/insure
confidentiality of files. 218
Although the Virginia opinion contended that "the attorney
is in no position to direct the auditing firm to exercise proper
precautions to maintain client confidentiality, 2 19 insurance
defense lawyers may indeed be able to persuade carriers to enter
into confidentiality agreements with auditors if they can demon-
strate that they may be obliged to withdraw from representation
in the absence of such agreements.
217. N.C., supra note 1, 1998 WL 609887, at *2.
218. Pa., supra note 1, 1997 WL 816708, at *3.
219. Va., supra note 1. The Virginia opinion also stated that "the billing
agency is not selected with due care as it is not selected by the attorney but by
the carrier." Id.
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3. Maintenance of Confidentiality in Time Entries Themselves
Insurance defense attorneys can help to prevent the disclo-
sure of confidential information by refraining from including
such information in their billing entries. Douglas R. Richmond
has argued that "it may not be necessary to reveal confidences or
secrets in legal bills. Time entries might be drafted so that confi-
dential information is kept confidential."22 As the Nebraska
opinion aptly observed, "[i] t would seem fairly easy to minimize
or eliminate confidential information from legal bills."'22
The burden should, of course, be upon the attorney to
ensure that bills submitted to outside auditors do not contain
confidential information. Accordingly, the Utah opinion has
properly stated that the lawyer has a duty to ensure that no confi-
dential information is in a billing statement that is supposed to
be disclosed to an auditor.22 2 The New York opinion likewise has
counseled attorneys to avoid placing confidential information in
bills.223 The Wisconsin opinion has suggested that "[c]ounsel
who . . . are concerned that the transmission of their bills to
others may breach client confidences should consider using
drafting protocols that assure their billing narratives do not
reveal client confidences." 22
4
Insurance companies should consider including provisions
in their billing guidelines requiring attorneys to avoid including
information in bills that would violate duties of confidentiality to
the clients if such information were disclosed to third parties.225
Similarly, the Maryland ethics opinion has stated that the insur-
ance defense counsel "may wish to review the agreement
between the auditor and the insurer" in order to "determine who
has access to the files and the procedures in place to ensure the
confidentiality of the information provided."226
As we have seen, various authorities differ in their opinions
about the degree to which legal bills are likely to contain confi-
220. Richmond, supra note 15, at 524.
221. Neb., supra note 1.
222. See Utah, supra note 1.
223. See N.Y., supra note 1.
224. Wisc., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.wisbar.org/
ethop/formal/ethics99-1 .html>.
225. One insurance company, for example, has admonished attorneys in
its guidelines that "[w]hen preparing billing invoices or statements, please
remember that your charges may be reviewed by a third-party billing company.
We ask that you not include information in your work description which would
violate your obligations to our insureds or any other party to protect their privi-
lege and confidential information." Hazard, supra note 156, at 30 n.52.
226. Md., supra note 1.
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dential information. 227 As one commentator has observed, the
deletion of such information could be difficult because "the
names of potential witnesses interviewed and similar information
would normally appear in a detailed bill but could be subject to
privilege. 2
28
Omission of confidential information also might be difficult
because an attorney would need to define what is confidential.
As one insurance defense attorney has observed, such attorneys
"will be confronted such fundamental questions as whether the
mere facts of the client's name and representation are confiden-
tial matters.
229
Moreover, the growing client demand for more detail and
specificity in billing2 0 is potentially at odds with efforts to purge
bills of confidential information. The state ethics opinions that
warn against submission of insurance defense bills to outside
auditors, therefore, create yet another irony, for they place insur-
ance defense attorneys in a Catch-22 situation: if the attorney's
bill is not sufficiently detailed, the auditor will complain about
vagueness, but if the bill is sufficiently detailed, it may violate the
attorney's duty of confidentiality. Mr. Richmond has suggested
that one way to avoid this dilemma is for insurers to "instruct
their auditors that if a time entry is vague or lacks sufficient detail
and the defense attorney explains that the time was so recorded
to safeguard confidential information, the auditors cannot ques-
tion the time entry. "231
4. Redaction of Confidential Information
Insurance companies or attorneys who transmit bills to the
auditors also might be able to preserve the privilege by redacting
confidential information from the bills provided to the auditor.
Such redaction would diminish the effectiveness of the review to
the extent that this would prevent the reviewer from evaluating
the propriety of an attorney's expenditure of time on specific
227. Compare Clarke v. American Comm. Nat'l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129
(9th Cir. 1992), and Hunterdon County Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n. Local
188 v. Township of Franklin, 669 A.2d 299, 302 (N.J. 1996), with Ky., supra note
1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.uky.edu/Law/kyethics/kba404.htm>.
228. Thomas M. Keating, Detailed Billing and Attorney-Client Privilege-The
Balancing Act, 84 ILL. B. J. 587, 588 (1996).
229. Cooley, supra note 25, at 21.
230. See Ross, supra note 5, at 63-68.
231. Richmond, supra note 15, at 524. Mr. Richmond acknowledges that
'this requires that the insurer trust defense counsel not to cloak false or inflated
time entries in bogus claims of confidentiality. Insurers simply should not hire
untrustworthy defense counsel." Id.
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issues relating to case strategy or other confidential subjects. The
redaction probably would not significantly diminish the effective-
ness of the audit, however, since such reviews generally are more
concerned with such issues as clarity of entries, excessive staffing,
billing for clerical work, extravagant disbursements, and other
issues which do not require the review of billing records that
reveal litigation strategy.
The recent opinion of the Louisiana State Bar Association's
Ethics Advisory Service Committee recommended "that the state-
ments be 'depersonalized' so that confidential information
would not be disclosed or recognized." '232 Insurance defense
attorney Andrew G. Cooley contends that this "editorial
approach may well be impossible to follow effectively" because it
"can be effective only if the editing eliminates all information
'relating to the representation' or what an independent con-
servative lawyer thinks would be embarrassing."23 Mr. Cooley
has also pointed out that "[t]he practical result is that little infor-
mation can be forwarded to the auditors" since "[t]he detail
demanded in the typical billing guidelines issued by the insur-
ance company would require defense counsel to violate ethical
obligations as interpreted by the various state bar
associations."234
5. Privilege Log
It would also be useful for the auditor to create a privilege
log which lists the names of any attorney and any agency involved
in the communication as participants or recipients of informa-
tion, along with the nature, subject matter, and date of any such
communication.235 In one recent case, the Second Circuit found
that the failure to maintain a privilege log resulted in the waiver
of privilege for communications between a defendant and its
public relations firm.23 6
6. Use of Separate Agency
Preservation of the attorney-client privilege also would
appear to be more likely if the insurance company hired an audi-
tor that does not provide the company with non-litigation func-
232. La., supra note 1.
233. Cooley, supra note 28, at 21.
234. Id.
235. See Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Rebel Oil Co., 157 F.R.D. 691, 697 (D.
Nev. 1994).
236. See Dorf & Stanton Communications v. Molson Breweries, 100 F.3d
919, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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tions. As we have seen, the Second Circuit's denial of the
privilege in Adlman was based in large part upon its finding that
the attorney had used the same auditor that the company used
for routine business.
7. Separate Retainer and Billing
Even if an insurance company submits its bills to an agency
that performs other non-privileged functions for the insurance
company, the insurance company should enter into a separate
agreement with the agency for these services, in order to make
clear that the function of the agent is different (and privileged)
when it reviews legal bills. Similarly, the company should ask
such an agent to submit bills which are separate from those
which it submits for routine business functions. The Second Cir-
cuit in AdIman, denied the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege and work product protection in part because of the lack
of a separate retainer and billing for the functions for which pro-
tection had been sought.
8. Statement of Privilege on Documents and Correspondence
All legal bills and correspondence that are sent to a review-
ing agency should make clear on their face that they are privi-
leged and confidential. Accordingly, it is useful to write or stamp
"Privileged and Confidential" or similar statements on all such
documents. 2 7
IV. BILLING GUIDELINES Do NOT INTERFERE WITH
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
Like legal audits, billing guidelines are an increasingly com-
mon method for the containment of legal costs. More than half
of the nearly one hundred outside counsel who responded to a
survey during 1994-95 reported that their companies provided
billing guidelines to clients. 238  As one commentator has
explained, " [ m] any insurers utilize litigation management guide-
lines in order to effectively manage litigation, to control costs,
and to clearly communicate objectives and expectations to
defense counsel regarding the cost-efficient handling of the
case."
239
237. See James T. Haight, Keeping the Privilege Inside the Corporation, 18 Bus.
LAW. 551, 559 (1963);JohnJ. Tigue,Jr. & Linda A. Lacewell, Protecting Corporate
Privileges: Attorney/Client & Work Product, Bus. CrIMES BULL.: COMPLIANCE &
LITIG. Mar. 1996, at 4, 5.
238. See Ross, supra note 5, at 6-7, 272.
239. John S. Pierce et al., supra note 29, at 2.
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Billing guidelines address numerous billing issues. Foi
example, typical billing guidelines require attorneys to keep cli-
ents informed about their work; establish procedures for regular
transmission of work product to the client; prohibit billing for
activities performed for more than one client at the same time
("double billing"); provide for requisite detail in billing state-
ments; require attorneys to bill in tenth of an hour units; require
notice of staff changes; mandate effective use of technology; and
impose limitations upon the number of attorneys who may be
deployed for various tasks.24 0 Some guidelines require an attor-
ney to obtain the client's advance approval before undertaking
certain types of work. Others merely require defense counsel to
inform the company before undertaking various projects. These
guidelines are based in large measure upon standards that courts
have developed in statutory fee' decisions.241
Although insurance defense attorneys sometimes complain
that it is difficult to follow guidelines since different companies
provide different guidelines, the chief claims officer of a major
insurance company has pointed that "keeping up with various
guidelines should not be too difficult because there is a common
thread that runs throughout them-communication with the
client. 2
4 2
Pending the outcome of the Montana declaratory judgment
action,243 no court has addressed the ethical propriety of billing
guidelines. In dictum, the California Court of Appeals has ques-
tioned "the wisdom and propriety of so-called 'outside counsel
guidelines by which insurers seek to limit or restrict certain types
of discovery, legal research, or computerized legal research by
outside attorneys."' 244 The court in that decision complained
that "[s] ome guidelines go so far as to call for the use of parale-
gals, rather than attorneys, to respond to 'routine' discovery
requests or prohibit the retention of experts or the filing of cer-
tain pretrial motions until shortly before trial."245 The court
warned that "[u]nder no circumstances can such guidelines be
240. See Ross, supra note 5, at 59-60, 52-53, 85, 68, 169, 110-11, 77, 106.
241. See Hazard, supra note 156, at 24.
242. Wissman, supra note 31, at 8 (quoting Michael A. Fortune, executive
vice president and chief claims officer of Zurich-American Insurance Group).
243. See In re Rules of Prof'I Conduct & Insurer-Imposed Billing Rules
and Procedures, No. 98-612 (Mont. filed Nov. 4, 1998).
244. Dynamics Concepts Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 882, 889
n.9 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
245. Id. at 889.
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permitted to impede the attorney's own professional judgment
about how best to competently represent the insureds.
2 46
In another recent decision, a federal judge in Montana
stated in dictum that an insurance company's guidelines for
outside counsel were in conflict with Rule 1 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure because they were so "bottom line oriented"
that they might "hamstring" an attorney's efforts to achieve the
'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" envisioned by the
rule.2 4 7 The judge warned that "[i]f a litigant's internal billing
'case management' practice are at odds with the efficient resolu-
tion of a case, particularly when 'in house' paralegals and lawyers
are controlling discovery, it will not interfere with the fair and
orderly processing of the case in Federal District Court."2 48
Recent opinions of state bar associations in eleven states
have expressed similar misgivings about billing guidelines and
have prohibited or restricted their use by attorneys. For exam-
ple, the Colorado opinion warned that "billing guidelines that
arbitrarily and unreasonably restrict compensation for time spent
by counsel performing services deemed necessary by counsel or
that impose arbitrary rates for specific services may discourage
the performance of such services. '"249
These opinions are based upon various ethics provisions,
particularly state versions of the prohibitions against conflicts of
interest and interferences with professional independence found
in Model Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(f)(2), and 5.4(c). 2 5 ° Some states
246. Id. The court stated that "[i]f the attorney's representation is to be
limited in any way that unreasonably interferes with the defense, it is the
insured, not the insurer, who should make that decision." Id.
247. Frederick v. Ulnum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 180 F.R.D. 384, 385 (D.
Mont. 1998). The judge also contended that the guidelines conflicted with
local rules of practice by unduly restricting local counsel. See id. The guidelines
provided, inter alia, that no legal services could be rendered unless approved in
advance; that outside attorneys must inform the company before making any
commitments on the company's behalf; that a company attorney must review all
briefs, motions, substantive pleadings, discovery responses, and settlement
motions; that the company would not pay for any legal work that did not
advance the ball; and that the company would not pay without advance
approval for any work that could more effectively have been performed in-
house. See id. The judge expressed particular objection to the company's
refusal to pay for anything that did not "advance the ball," declaring that
"[Il]itigation is not a game in which counsel are paid only when they 'advance
the ball.'" Id.
248. Id. at 386.
249. Colo., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.cobar.org/
comms/ethics/fo/fo_107.htm>.
250. See, e.g., id.; Fla., supra note 1; Mont., supra note 2; Wash., supra note
1; Wisc., supra note 1; Vt., supra note 1.
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have also found that guidelines would implicate an attorney's
duty to provide competent representation under state analogues
to Model Rule 1.1251 and the duty of diligence under Rule 1.3.
Despite their wariness about billing guidelines,252 the ethics
opinions have not found them to be unethical per se.
The Montana ethics opinion, for example, acknowledges
that "independent counsel may comply with those of the
insurer's requests for information which merely serve to keep the
insurer appraised of the general status of the litigation and with
those billing procedures which merely serve to keep the insurer
informed as to what services it pays for. '25 3 The Washington state
opinion warns:
[A billing guideline] that arbitrarily and unreasonably limits
or restricts compensation for the time spent by counsel
performing services which counsel considers necessary to
adequate representation, such as periodic review of plead-
ings, conducting depositions, or in preparing or defending
a summaryjudgment motion, endeavors to direct or regu-
late the lawyer's professional judgment in violation of RPC
5.4(c) 254
The same opinion states that "a billing guideline that imposes
'de facto' or arbitrary rates for certain services performed by a
lawyer, such as compensating a lawyer at prevailing paralegal
rates when the firm does not employ paralegals, operates as a
disincentive in violation of RPC 5.4(c). '"55
Likewise, Tennessee's ethics opinion disapproves billing
guidelines, stating that "any directive by the insurance company
which compels an attorney to alter his/her representation of the
insured would be improper."2 56 And the Iowa opinion declared:
251. See Mont., supra note 2; Wisc., supra note 1. Rule 1.1 of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that "[a] lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1998).
252. See Wisc., supra note 1. Model Rule 1.3 states that " [a] lawyer shall
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client," MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.1 (1998). As one commentator has
stated, "[a] defense attorney who unreasonably delays or postpones activities
because of outside counsel guidelines may violate Rule 1.1." Richmond, supra
note 42, at 534.
253. Mont., supra note 2, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.montana
bar.org/attorneyinfo/ethicsopinions/90051 7.htxm>.
254. Wash., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.wsba.org/
bog/pres/fo/fo195.html> (emphasis added).
255. Id.
256. Tenn., supra note 1, 1999 WL 406886, at *4 (emphasis added).
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[I]t would be improper for an Iowa lawyer to agree to,
accept or follow Guidelines which seek to direct, control or
regulate the lawyer's professional judgment or details of
the lawyer's performance; dictate the strategy or tactics to
be employed; or limit the professional discretion and con-
trol of the lawyer.25 7
The opinions are based in part upon various state ethics
opinions which have expressed fear that efforts to limit attorney
fees in insurance litigation would be prejudicial to insureds. Sev-
eral state bar associations have stated that a fixed fee for an
insured's attorney hired by an insurer could be set so low as to
create an impermissible risk that the insurer would encourage
the lawyer to provide inferior legal services, 25' and the Kentucky
Supreme Court has prohibited all fixed fee arrangements for
attorneys hired by insurance carriers. 59
These recent ethics opinions that discourage the use of bill-
ing guidelines are misguided insofar as they are based on the
theory that guidelines diminish professional independence or
interfere with an attorney's obligation to an insured. Although
substantive alteration of the representation might indeed inter-
fere with the attorney's obligations to the insured, the issues
addressed by typical billing guidelines do not interfere with the
attorney's professional judgment or materially "alter" his or her
representation of the insured. There does not need to be any
conflict between an attorney's compliance with billing guidelines
and Model Rule 5.4(c).
Some of the ethics opinions appear to have failed to distin-
guish between guidelines that diminish the qality of work and
those that actually interfere with an attoiIey's exercise of
independent judgment. The Vermont opinion, for example,
complained that the guidelines that were the subject of its opin-
ion seemed "designed to cut costs without regard for the ability
of a lawyer to conduct a vigorous defense, and effectively
257. Iowa, supra, note 2.
258. See Ohio State Bar Ass'n, Op. 97-7 (1997); Or. State Bar Ass'n, Op.
1991-98; N.H. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. (1991); Wisc. State Bar Comm. On Prof'l
Ethics, Op. E-83-15 (1983).
259. American Ins. Ass'n v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 917 S.W.2d 568, 569-74
(Ky. 1996). The court explained that "the pressures exerted by the insurer
through the set fee interferes with the exercise of the attorney's independent
professional judgment." Id. at 572. The court also contended that a set fee
arrangement "creates a situation in which the attorney has an interest in the
outcome of action which conflicts with the duties owed to the client: quite
simply, in easy cases, counsel will take a financial windfall; in difficult cases,
counsel will take a financial loss." Id.
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depriv[e] the lawyer of the opportunity to exercise professional
judgement in determining how to best conduct such a
defense. '260 An examination of the guidelines discussed in the
Vermont opinion, however, reveals nothing that would appear to
interfere with professional judgment. Guidelines that require
billing entries to include the name of the parties to communica-
tions and the subject matter of communications seem to consti-
tute a healthy attempt to require the lawyers to provide both the
insured and the insurer with sufficient information to enable
them to assess the reasonableness of the bills; courts and com-
mentators have strongly encouraged such details in billing
entries for conferences and phone calls.261 Similarly, guidelines
that prohibit deposition digests and deferral of any form of trial
preparation until trial is imminent appear very likely to foster
sensible economies. Guidelines that discourage the use of
paralegals in favor of outside clerical vendors and discourage the
use of experienced attorneys for initial research could encourage
economies, depending upon the facts of a case. And guidelines
that refuse payment for computerized research and proofreading
and revision of first drafts seem likely to diminish the quality of
legal services. But compliance with none of these guidelines
should affect a lawyer's professional judgment.
As Professor Silver has observed, the contention that billing
guidelines violate Model Rule 5.4 "fails to draw an elementary
distinction between freedom of judgment and freedom of
action. Even to the extent that billing guidelines may restrict
an attorney's conduct, they "do not limit the content or nature of
the advice lawyers can render. Only restrictions that fetter law-
yers' freedom to give clients the benefit of their judgment can run
afoul of' Rule 54.263 Similarly, Mr. Richmond has observed that
"[i]nsurers do not intend outside counsel guidelines to ham-
string defense counsel. Certainly insurers never anticipated that
their guidelines might have ethical or malpractice ramifications
for defense counsel. 264
Moreover, the rules themselves do not give an attorney
unfettered discretion over the conduct of litigation. As Dean
Syverud has pointed out, Model Rule 1.2(a) contemplates that
the attorney will abide by an insurance company's instructions
260. Vt., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.vtbar.org/>.
261. See Ross, supra note 5, at 64.
262. Brief for Amicus Curiae Charles Silver at 2, In re Prof'l Conduct &
Insurer-Imposed Billing Rules & Procedures, No. 98-612 (Mont. filed Nov. 4,
1998) [hereinafter Silver].
263. Id.
264. Richmond, supra note 43, at 531.
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"to limit the expenses incurred to those deemed reasonable and
to restrict certain expenditures that, in many cases, are unlikely
to be cost-effective or necessary to the defense." 65 The insur-
ance company, rather than the insured, is generally in a much
better position to determine how to conduct the litigation in the
best interests of both the insurance company and the insured.266
Indeed, it is the insurance company that will principally bear the
burden of mistaken decisions, since the insurance company typi-
cally pays all of a claim. Similarly, the insurance company may be
liable to the insured if it errs in conducting its defense.2 67
Billing guidelines therefore do not necessarily interfere with
an attorney's independent judgment. Such guidelines merely
impose procedural restrictions on the logistics of the representa-
tion rather than substantive restraints on strategy. For example,
it is impossible to imagine how a billing guideline which requires
an attorney to bill in units of one-tenth of an hour rather in quar-
ter-hour units interferes with the professional judgment of an
attorney. Similarly, restrictions on such matters as how many
attorneys can attend a deposition or the extent to which attor-
neys can perform clerical tasks such as photo-copying of docu-
ments do not appear to any manner restrict the professional
judgment of an attorney. Even the strict Washington opinion
acknowledges:
An attorney may ethically comply with the billing guide-
lines of a person other than the client who pays the law-
yer's bill, where the billing guidelines do not endeavor to
direct or regulate the lawyer's independent professional
judgment and permit defense counsel to provide a degree
265. Syverud, supra note 150, at 180. MODEL Rule 1.2(a) provides that
"[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of repre-
sentation ... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they
shall be pursued." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a)
(1998).
266. See id.:
For more than a century, lawyers jointly representing the interests of
the insurance company and the insured have deferred to the insur-
ance company on these sorts of questions for the obvious reason that
the insurance company is the client with the delegated authority, pur-
suant to the insurance contract, to manage the litigation. It is also the
client which is in the best position, given its extensive risk-manage-
ment and litigation experience, to effectively undertake that responsi-
bility for the benefit of both the insureds and itself.
267. SeeJoint Brief for Respondents at 29-31, In re Profl Conduct (98-612).
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of detail and narrative description in billings that meets
the test for nondisclosure of confidential information.
268
Proponents of the lawfulness of billing guidelines have
pointed out in the Montana litigation that there is no evidence in
Montana or in any other state that billing guidelines have ever
prejudiced the defense of an insured. 26 9 Most billing guidelines
are flexible enough to permit attorneys to permit attorneys to
seek permission from the client when the attorney believes that
the client's best interests require her to exceed limitations pre-
scribed by the guidelines. Indeed, the most outstanding charac-
teristic of billing guidelines is their encouragement of attorneys
to communicate more regularly and effectively with their clients.
Clients tend to interpret the letter of their guidelines liberally if
they believe that the attorney is abiding by the spirit of the guide-
lines by trying to contain costs. 27 ° Guidelines, as the word
"guideline" suggests, are usually intended merely as guideposts
rather than as rigid rules.
2 71
Moreover, the danger that reductions in litigation expenses
will prejudice the insured is generally minimal because the large
majority of insurance claims are resolved within policy limits. 2 72
Professor Silver has estimated that "covered claims are resolved
within the policy limits more than 95 percent of the time."2 73
It is therefore ironic that billing guidelines, which facilitate a
guiding principle of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
insofar as they encourage communication between a client and
an attorney, are alleged to breach ethical duties. As Professor
Hazard has stated in connection with the Montana case:
A requirement of consultation permits the lawyer and the
insurer to deal with the conflict of interest inherent in
hourly billing. It is always in the lawyer's interest to do
more work, as that will generate higher fees. . . . Both
abuse and subconscious excess can be restrained by requir-
268. Wash., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.wsba.org/
bog/pres/fo/fol 95.html>.
269. See Hazard, supra note 156, at 18.
270. See Ross, supra note 5, at 254.
271. As Dean Syverud has explained:
Generally; the Guidelines do nothing more than develop a clear, up-
front understanding between the insurer and the lawyer as to what the
insurer expects of counsel. The Guidelines also enable the lawyer to
make an informed decision regarding the necessity and benefits of
performing certain services before incurring expenses attendant to
those services.
Syverud, supra note 150, at 182.
272. See Hazard, supra note 156, at 4.
273. See Silver, supra note 262, at 12.
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ing the lawyer to think through and explain why a particu-
lar action is recommended. The lawyer's evaluation is
sharpened by responding to the adjuster's comments and
questions.
2 74
Even if one assumes for the sake of argument that such
interference could occur in the context of particular guidelines,
this would not render all guidelines violative of an attorney's pro-
fessional judgment. Any contrary argument would suggest that
an insurer who pays legal bills can have no control over those
bills and must pay whatever bill the attorney submits, regardless
of the bill's reasonableness.
There also appear to be adequate safeguards to prevent bill-
ing guidelines from interfering with an attorney's professional
judgment. If a potential attorney for an insured concluded that
an insured's billing guidelines would interfere with the attorney's
professional judgment, the attorney could decline to undertake
the representation. If the attorney concluded that the guidelines
were not unduly restrictive and accepted the representation but
found later that the directives from the insurer interfered with
his judgment, he could attempt to convince the insurer that the
guideline should be amended or waived.2 7 5
Indeed, once the representation has begun, the attorney
would be required pursuant to Model Rule 1.4 to communicate
with the insured in a manner that enabled the insured to partici-
pate intelligently in his representation. Professors Hazard and
Hodes have suggested that Model Rule 1.4 seems to require a
lawyer to provide a client with information that will help the cli-
ent to decide whether the services received by the client will be
worth the price and whether the continuatio. of a legal matter
274. Hazard, supra note 156, at 14-15. Accordingly, Professor Hazard has
concluded:
[T] he advance planning and consultation contemplated by the Guide-
lines are legitimate means of protecting the insurer's interests in the
efficient and prudent conduct of the defense. They need not entail
any sacrifice of the insured's interests, especially if (as is usually true)
the insured faces no financial risk that is not covered by the insurance.
To the extent that such consultation avoids unnecessary discovery or
motion practice, it also benefits the judicial system.
Id. at 3-4. Similarly, Professor Hazard has aptly observed that "[a] n insurance
policy is not a blank check, entitling the defense counsel to be paid for
whatever services counsel chooses to render. Rather, the services must be
appropriate to the case and the charges reasonable." Id. at 21-22.
275. See Colo., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.cobar.
org/comms/ethics/fo/fo_107.htm> (stating that obtaining permission of the
insurer not to follow the guidelines is one alternative if the attorney concludes
that billing guidelines interfere with his professional judgment).
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will be worth the cost.27 6 This communication can include infor-
mation concerning legal services that the insurer refused, but
that the attorney deemed to be necessary for the insured's ade-
quate defense, thereby enabling the insured to remonstrate with
the insurer.
If the guidelines truly interfered with the attorney's profes-
sional judgment and the attorney had a good working relation-
ship with the insurer, the arrangement of a mutually satisfactory
compromise would normally not be difficult. As one commenta-
tor has observed, "[w] orking together to resolve problems in the
best interests of the insured has been what insurers and defense
attorneys have always done. Compliance with insurer litigation
guidelines should not change this. ' 2 7 7 If the attorney could not
persuade the insurer to alter or waive a guideline that interfered
with the attorney's professional integrity, the attorney could
resign from the representation.
278
Ultimately, the attorney must decide for herself whether bill-
ing guidelines interfere with her professional judgment. 279
Accordingly, the Colorado Bar Association opinion understanda-
bly could not "find any bright line rule that can be used to distin-
guish the point where the attorney's professional judgment is
compromised. ' 28 0 The Colorado opinion properly cautioned
attorneys "against agreeing to guidelines prior to evaluating how
they would apply to foreseeable situations in the cases to which
the guidelines would apply."'2 1' The Colorado opinion also aptly
urged attorneys to regularly monitor guidelines to avoid interfer-
ence with professional judgment.282
276. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, A Look at the Ethical
Rules; Fee Shifting in the Federal Courts, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR: AN
ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BlLING METHODS 124 (Richard C. Reed ed.,
1989).
277. John A. Conlon, Insurer Litigation Guidelines: Attorney Ethical Consider-
ations, REs GESTAE, Oct. 1998, at 11.
278. See Colo., supra note 1, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.cobar.
org/comms/ethics/fo/fo_107.htm> (stating that refusal to abide by the guide-
lines and withdrawal as counsel is another alternative if the attorney concludes
that billing guidelines interfere with his professional judgment).
279. As the Montana opinion concluded, "[i]n the final analysis,
independent counsel must determine on a situational basis what information
he can supply to the insurer without violating the ethical duties to the client."
Mont., supra note 2, (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.montanabar.org/attor-
neyinfo/ethicsopinions/900517 .htm>.
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As with submission of legal bills to outside auditors, the use
of billing guidelines should ultimately benefit insureds by help-
ing to contain or reduce premiums and preventing insurance
companies from discontinuing types of coverage which may
become prohibitively expensive for the companies.
Even if insurers are not deemed to be clients of insurance
defense attorneys, such attorneys would still not violate their ethi-
cal obligations to the insured by following such guidelines, for
insurance contracts generally provide that policy holders shall
consent "to the insurance company's direction of the defense
and any settlement of the action."283 Billing guidelines help
insurance companies to fulfill their statutory and contractual
obligations to provide cost-efficient defense to their insureds.284
Accordingly, it is probably not necessary for insurance defense
lawyers to obtain the consent of policy holders in order to ethi-
cally abide by billing guidelines, notwithstanding the contrary
contention of several of the state ethics opinions.285
Just as insurers have incentives to avoid compromising client
confidences in the submission of bills to auditors, insurers like-
wise have reason to avoid disregarding sound advice from their
attorneys because such disregard could make the carrier liable to
the insured in tort or contract if the judgment exceeded the
amount of the policy.286 Dean Syverud has observed that "it
283. Syverud, supra note 150, at 181. As Dean Syverud has pointed out,
"obtaining the benefit of the insurer's claim handling experience is often one
factor an insured considers in purchasing insurance." Id.
284. As the Respondents' brief in the Montana case points out in arguing
that the guidelines are ethical even if the Montana court reversed its own prece-
dent and found that the insured was the sole client:
The insurance contract delegates to the insurer the right and duty to
control the defense of the litigation, including the right to monitor
the costs and legal services attendant to that defense. Were insurers
unable to impose the consultation and other requirements contem-
plated by the Guidelines, they could not possibly satisfy their statutory
and contractual obligations to investigate and settle claims in good
faith, and to provide an adequate defense.
Joint Brief of Respondents at 18, In re Prof'l Conduct & Insurer-Imposed Billing
Rules & Procedures, No. 98-612 (Mont. filed Nov. 4, 1998).
285. For example, the Virginia opinion stated:
[I]t is ethically impermissible for an attorney to agree to an insurance
carrier's restrictions on the attorney's representation of the insured
absent full disclosure and consent of the client at the outset of the
representation and absent a determination that the client's rights will
not be materially impaired by the restrictions.
Va., supra note 2. See also Wash., supra note 1.
286. As one commentator has pointed out:
Most jurisdictions subject insurers to substantial extracontractual dam-
ages and even punitive damages for bad faith handling of claims.
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would take a remarkably bold insurance company" to reject an
attorney's advice that it believed that conformity with the billing
guidelines would harm the interests of the insured.28 7 Similarly,
Professor Hazard has pointed out that "[i] t is extremely unlikely
that an insurer would have any incentive to overrrule a recom-
mendation the lawyer described as essential to the protection of
the insured" since the "ample remedies (including bad faith
claims)" that are available to an insured who is harmed by an
insurer's refusal 'to approve recommended legal work "make it
extremely perilous for an insured to refuse a recom-
mendation."2
8
Some of the respondent insurance companies in the Mon-
tana case have submitted affidavits stating that they rarely with-
hold approval of activities recommended by defense counsel if
those attorneys, after further consultation, continue to recom-
mend the activity.2 9 Indeed, some of the respondents in the
Montana case say that they always have approved any activity that
defense counsel has argued to be essential for the protection of
the insured.290 For example, if a insurer imposed what the attor-
ney regarded as unreasonable limitations on the amount of time
that the attorney could spend researching an issue that the attor-
ney regarded as critical to the outcome of the case, the attorney
could explain to the insurer why the time was needed.
Since the ultimate question of whether an insurance com-
pany is required to pay for legal services depends upon the con-
tractual obligations of the insurance company toward the
insured, the attorney can continue the representation if the
insured and the insurer can work out their differences within the
context of their contract.
Even if purely contractual remedies might have left some harm to
insureds uncompensated, bad faith tort remedies are unlikely to do so.
Existence of causes of action for bad faith give insurers powerful
incentives to protect the interests of their insureds and gives insureds
who have not been protected powerful remedies for any injuries done
them.
William T. Barker, The Tripartite Relationship and Protection of the Insured: Is There
a Problem?, INS. LIT. RPTR., Oct. 1, 1999, at 6.
287. Syverud, supra note 150, at 184. Although Dean Syverud reached
this conclusion in the context of the bad faith law of Montana, the prevalence
of statutes and common law that protect insureds presumably make his observa-
tion relevant to most jurisdictions.
288. Hazard, supra note 156, at 4.
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CONCLUSION
The many recent state ethics opinions that have questioned
the ethical propriety of billing guidelines and the submission of
insurance defense bills to outside auditors have created an
unnecessary and ironic controversy. The controversy is unneces-
sary because the use of guidelines and legal auditors is not likely
to prejudice policy holders. The controversy is ironic because
restrictions on the use of guidelines and legal auditors could
actually harm policy holders.
Contrary to the contention of the various state ethics opin-
ions, legal audits and billing guidelines are not likely to interfere
with the professional judgment of attorneys since legal auditors
ordinarily only examine the format of bills and identify technical
problems rather than question substantive decisions concerning
the conduct of litigation. To the extent that attorneys believe
that such guidelines or audits interfere with their professional
judgment, they may communicate their concerns to the insurer.
Since most insurers have good working relationships with their
attorneys, the insurers are likely to heed the advice of their coun-
sel. Moreover, insurers have an incentive to heed their attorneys'
advice in order to assure a favorable outcome in the case and to
avoid liability to policy holders under various causes of action in
tort and contract. In the unlikely event that an insurer and an
attorney could not agree about litigation strategy, the attorney
could withdraw from the representation.
The state ethics opinions also erroneously assume that sub-
mission of legal bills to outside auditors will compromise the
attorney's duty to maintain client confidences. Some of the
opinions have also suggested that the submission of legal bills to
auditors might breach the attorney-client privilege. Most legal
bills, however, are not likely to contain any confidential informa-
tion that would materially prejudice the interests of policy
holders.
To the extent that such bills might contain confidential
information, there are many ways in which an attorney can avoid
breaching her duty to maintain client confidences. Virtually all
of the ethics opinions agree that an attorney could properly
obtain the informed consent of the insured. Many of the opin-
ions are unduly pessimistic, however, about the likelihood that
insureds would offer consent because the opinions fail to appre-
ciate that auditing benefits the insured as well as the insurer.
In addition to obtaining the informed consent of insureds,
attorneys may also comply with their duty to maintain confi-
dences through various other means, including confidentiality
AN IRONIC AND UNNECESSARY CONTROVERSY
agreements signed by auditors; maintenance of confidentiality in
time entries themselves; redaction of confidential information
from bills sent to auditors; creation of privilege logs; the use of
auditors who do not perform other functions for insurance com-
panies; the use of separate retainer and billing agreements with
auditors who perform multiple functions; and the liberal denom-
ination of documents as "confidential" or "privileged."
The use of billing guidelines and audits serves the best inter-
ests of attorneys, insurance companies, and insurance policy
holders. Far from prejudicing policy holders, the use of billing
guidelines and outside auditors helps to protect their interests by
ensuring that their attorneys manage their case in an efficient
and ethical manner. Curtailment of excessive legal costs ulti-
mately helps all insureds by helping to reduce insurance premi-
ums. The use of guidelines and auditors also benefit insurance
companies by helping them to manage costs, and they serve the
legal profession by helping to curb abuses that have created fric-
tion between clients and lawyers and have diminished public con-
fidence in the legal profession.
A partial solution to the controversy over the use of billing
guidelines and legal auditing may arise out of the use of alterna-
tives to time-based billing,29" ' although these carry their own ethi-
cal dangers.292 Despite growing experimentation with alternative
forms of billing, however, time-based billing remains standard
practice in most types of practice, including insurance litiga-
tion. 29 ' The need for billing guidelines and outside auditors is
therefore likely to remain a feature of insurance defense work.
Time-honored ethical rules governing the ethically complex
tripartite relationship among lawyers, insurers, and insureds are
291. See, e.g., Barbara J. Buba, Profitable Client Relations: Keeping the Client
Happy Without Losing Your Shirt in the Auditing Process, DEF. RESEARCH INST.: L.
OFFICE ECON. SEMINAR, 1999, at 27. One insurance industry official has urged
insurance defense attorneys to "come up with a better way" of billing:
[Insurance defense attorneys should use a method of billing that] fits
what the client needs .... If the client asks for procedures in order
for the client to feel comfortable... in an hourly billing system that
irritate [s] the attorney, then.., the time has come for those attorneys
to . . . develop an alternative billing system.
Wissman, supra note 31, at 2 (quoting Janet E. Bachman, vice president of
claims administration of the American Insurance Ass'n).
292. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 5, at 237-48; Ronald D. Rotunda, Moving
from Billable Hours to Fixed Fees: Task-Based Fees and Legal Ethics, 47 U. KAN. L.
REv. 819 (1999).
293. See Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of
an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REv. 871, 951 n. 189
(1999).
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quite sufficient to accommodate the new issues that have arisen
out the use of billing guidelines and outside auditors. Although
the recent state ethics opinions offer apt reminders of the ethical
duties that insurance defense attorneys owe to insureds, any
imposition of novel restrictions on the use of guidelines and
auditors are unnecessary and are likely to harm attorneys, insur-
ers, and policy holders.
